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FOREWORD
By virtue of its strategic location at the intersection of
Europe and Asia, Turkey plays a pivotal role in the post-cold war
system of states. It lies, one could say, at the epicenter of a
series of conflicts, real and potential, in both continents. It
also has enjoyed noticeable growth in both economic prosperity
and democracy since 1980. And because Turkey has been, and
remains, a faithful U.S. ally, Washington has called upon it to
play a role in the Balkans, Near East, and former Soviet empire
commensurate with its new-found political and economic
development.
This report analyzes the implications of Turkey's policies
and the reactions of Turkey's neighbors in three discrete
chapters. The authors focus their conclusions and options for
U.S. policymakers on the effect of Turkish policies in Europe,
the Middle East, and the former Soviet republics. The final
chapter summarizes their conclusions with respect to the three
regions and provides policy options for continuing U.S.-Turkish
relations that are so important in the search for peace and
stability in these regions. The authors and the Strategic Studies
Institute welcome readers' comments and will continue to assess
developments in this vital area of Western and U.S. concern.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

SUMMARY
Turkey sits astride Europe, particularly the Balkans, the
Middle East, and the former Soviet empire now known as the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In addition, since 1980
Turkey has compiled an enviable record of economic growth and
democratization in politics. For these reasons U.S. policymakers
have assumed that Turkey, a steadfast U.S. ally, is especially
well-poised to play a role as an anchor in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), as a positive pole of attraction for
the Middle East and southern republics of the ex-USSR in
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and as a block against a
resurgence of Russian power and/or Iranian fundamentalism.
This analysis of Turkey's policies and current geostrategic
or geopolitical role in these regions is contained in three
independent chapters that consider the extent to which Turkey can
play those roles expected by its leaders and elites and by U.S.
policymakers, as well. In his analysis, Lieutenant Colonel
William T. Johnsen observes that Turkey's role in Europe has both
magnified and declined since the fall of the Soviet empire. On
the one hand, its importance for the Middle East, which could
become an out-of-area threat to Europe, has visibly grown. On the
other, Turkey's application to the European Union (EU) (formerly
European Community [EC]) and, by implication, the Western
European Union (WEU), has been deflected and delayed, causing a
great deal of concern in Turkey as to European suspicion of
Turkey. In addition, NATO as a whole and Turkey's role in
particular have come under question in the absence of a definable
threat and Western Europe's visible disinclination to shoulder
security burdens in the Balkans.
Nowhere is that disinclination and Turkish suspicion of
European objectives more clear than in the Bosnian war where
Turkey continues to see a Muslim state wiped out in Europe while
nobody takes action against Serbia. There are fears that entry
into Europe through integration with European security
organizations, the fundamental priority of Turkish foreign
policy, is in danger, and that Turkey runs a risk of being
somehow marginalized in European calculations. Accordingly,
Turkey will and has come closer to the United States to seek
support for and understanding of its ultimate objectives.
Turkey's integration into Europe is, Johnsen argues, in our
interests, and should be supported by a series of U.S.
initiatives in and out of NATO to strengthen its standing in
Europe, win support for this integration, and bolster Turkey's
self-confidence about its future prospects.
But, on the other hand, it is clear that, because of this
disconnection between Europe and Turkey, it would be fallacious
to expect that Turkey undertake a leading or even unilateral role
in assuring Balkan security or the lead in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Greco-Turkish rivalry has grown in the recent
past, and while one cannot forecast what the new Papandreou

government in Greece will do, the Bosnian war, Cyprus, and other
issues have brought this rivalry into the center of regional
security agendas and further complicated Turkey's efforts to win
support for its European objectives. Much depends on U.S.
support for Turkey, but it cannot be said that even then Turkey's
problems will be sufficiently reduced for it to satisfy its
objectives. But otherwise, there is hardly any prospect for
successful Turkish integration into Europe in the near-to-medium
term.
Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere focuses on the complexities that
Turkey's own unresolved domestic issues, in particular the
Kurdish insurgency in its southeast, pose for Turkey's overall
security relationship with its Near Eastern neighbors: Syria,
Iran, and Iraq. From Dr. Pelletiere's analysis it is clear Iran
and Syria are using the Kurdish issue to coerce Turkey. They fear
Ankara's close ties with the United States which, they believe,
is a vehicle for spreading the influence of the West into the
region. Thus, support for Kurdish rebels has become an instrument
of these states' policies, to be turned on and off in order to
achieve their aims or to pressure Turkey.
Today, as Turkey assumes a clearer rivalry in the area with
Iran, he argues that Iran has stepped up its support for the
Kurdish insurgents and is using them to unhinge Turkey at home.
At the same time Turkey appears to be playing a dangerously
uncertain hand in its own policies towards the insurgents because
it is relying almost exclusively on military repression of the
movements involved and neglecting the socio-economic and
political alternatives many Western observers believe must be
employed to resolve the Kurdish issue. Indeed, the army has
evidently threatened to impose martial law in the spring of 1994
if the insurgency is not crushed. But as long as this issue
remains an increasingly vital and first-order military priority,
Turkey will face an enormous task of domestic reconstruction, be
at odds with its neighbors over their support for the insurgents,
and find itself castigated in the United States and Europe for
human rights violations. At the same time, if it continues to
resort exclusively to military tactics of counterinsurgency,
Turkey may risk the progress in democratization that it has
achieved and undermine not only its domestic stability but also
its ability to play a leading role in any international venue.
This prospect is particularly troubling because the Kurdish
areas of Turkey are the only ones in which U.S. forces are
directly engaged through our participation in OPERATION PROVIDE
COMFORT. U.S. forces, using this area for that relief operation
and for overflights and monitoring of Iraqi compliance with U.N.
resolutions, could be drawn into future hostilities over the
Kurdish issue. Since there are grounds for believing that Iran
and Iraq, as well as possibly Syria, see that U.S. engagement as
a potential base for a long-term U.S. military presence that is
directly aimed at them, there are real possibilities for an
anti-American coalition, either political or even military,

employing terrorism, low-intensity conflict operations, and the
like that could involve the United States as well as offer
serious problems for Turkey.
As numerous analysts have noted, Turkey cannot play a role
of a model and commercial entrepot for the new former Soviet
republics if it cannot solve its own extensive domestic problems.
In his chapter, detailing Turkey's relations with the new states
in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and Russia, Dr. Stephen J.
Blank assesses the prospect for Turkey to play this role and
finds it substantially overdrawn. Both the United States and
Turkey in 1991-92 believed that Turkey ought to take a leading
role in the stabilization of the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and
Central Asia, against revived Russian imperialism and, in
particular, Iranian-type fundamentalism. Regardless of the fact
that these new societies of largely Muslim persuasion are very
unlike Iran, it appears that Turkey's domestic problems and the
economic crisis of enormous magnitude afflicting those areas
precludes Turkey from successfully playing the role hoped for by
the United States.
Turkey's main concrete objectives have been to dominate
these new states' energy economy and thus enrich itself and tie
them into a Turkish-led economic system, and to prevent the
return of Russian military pressure to and on its borders. In
both objectives it is failing or has demonstratively failed. In
the Black Sea, efforts at security collaboration with Ukraine and
larger regional coordination through the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) have failed to give Turkey what it
wants. In Ukraine, failure to reform has led Ukraine to sell its
Black Sea Fleet and nuclear arms to Russia, although it denies
doing so, in return for debt relief. In the BSECZ, Greece and
Russia are combining to block any Turkish leadership role.
In the Transcaucasus, during 1993 it became clear that
Turkey was deterred effectively from acting against Armenian
expansion and threats to dismember Azerbaijan that have developed
in the course of the long war over Nagorno- Karabakh. Turkish
helplessness to aid even a pro-Ankara government and Russia's
ability to unseat that government, and replace it with a
pro-Moscow one that now has rejoined the CIS and is accepting
long-term Russian bases there denotes the breakdown of Turkey's
defense strategy. As a result of Russian overt and covert
operations throughout this region, Russian troops will be
stationed in all three states, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan,
and Russia alone will probably play the role of "peacemaker" in
the region's numerous ethnic conflicts. Turkey has also failed to
monopolize or gain a commanding role in the energy economy of
Transcaucasia. Instead it is locked in a bruising economic
rivalry with Russia over transshipment routes and pipelines. The
outcome remains undecided, but it cannot end better than in a
compromise where Russia gains the most.
Although Turkey has invested heavily in Central Asia, it is

still unable to provide what the pro-Moscow rulers of the region
most need, military security and control over energy and
transportation, and food trade. Central Asian rulers, whatever
their private inclinations, have been obliged to rejoin the
Russian economic sphere by quite brutal Muscovite policies and
have also evinced growing suspicion of Turkey's activities.
Moreover, other states, not just Iran, Russia, and Pakistan, are
competing for influence in the region, allowing local leaders to
pick and choose among them. Turkey's own limitations emerge in
this context as the most serious factor inhibiting it from
playing the leadership role in Central Asia that was previously
expected.
Finally, there are strains growing in the relationship with
Washington. U.S. aid is being cut and converted into loans.
Turkey's efforts to reverse that trend and get stable guarantees
has led to growing resort to mutual blackmail over aid and bases,
and a threat to condition aid on solution of the Kurdish problem.
That would mean making Turkey's entire international position
hostage to its ability to satisfy Washington and/or Europe on
this problem at a time when neither one of them appears fully
committed to helping Turkey achieve its and their interests. Thus
the report concludes with suggestions for improving the
relationship and calls for a clear U.S. strategy and concept of
U.S. and Turkish interests in the regions of mutual engagement so
that the United States can help Ankara overcome its problems.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The revolutionary upheavals taking place in Europe, the
Middle East, and the former Soviet Union have fundamentally
transformed the strategic position of Turkey, which sits astride
all three areas. The collapse of Soviet power, the continuing
uncertainties of European integration, the agony of the former
Yugoslavia, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and the first fruits of the
Arab-Israeli peace process (i.e., the accord between Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] signed in Washington
in September 1993) pose both challenges and opportunities to
Turkey. This report, therefore, examines Turkey's strategic
conditions, analyzes its options in a fast moving international
system, assesses the implications of its policies and positions
for the United States, and offers policy recommendations, both
for Turkey and the United States.
Today the emergence of largely Turkic republics in Central
Asia onto the world political stage offers Turkey the chance to
be a model for their westernization and integration into the
world economy and culture. Alternatively, the unsettled and even
desperate conditions, including several wars, in these republics
could drag Turkey into their maelstroms and deflect it from full
integration with Europe, its chosen goal since the reforms of the
Tanzimat period, 150 years ago.
Europe, however, might rebuff Turkey's efforts to play a
larger role in the European Union (EU) (formerly European
Community [EC]), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the Western European Union (WEU), and any future European
security systems. Such a turn of events could force Ankara to
look East even as European rejection undercuts Turkey's claims to
be a fully western state; thus, making Turkey less attractive to
eastern societies. Alternatively, unresolved economic and ethnic
issues afflicting Turkey (that is, continuing high inflation, an
excessively bureaucratized economy, and the Kurdish issue) could
make Turkey unattractive to either the East or the West. And,
although progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process has now
dramatically transformed prospects for the region, the Middle
East is by no means free of all its multiple conflicts that could
involve Turkey and its vital interests.
In other words, Turkey's role in Europe, the Middle East,
Central Asia, and Transcaucasia will likely remain in
considerable flux for the foreseeable future. Turkey's transition
to a new system of interstate relations cannot be fixed at this
time, but the results will have tremendous effects on Turkey, the
critical regions it sits astride, and the United States. Turkey
could rise to the occasion and pioneer a vast expansion of the
economic potential of former Soviet republics in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia as it extends its sphere of influence by virtue of
its connection to these regions and Europe. Or, Turkey could be

drawn into conflicts that work against European, Central Asian,
and Middle Eastern integration and peace. The U.S. connection is
crucial because the United States has consistently promoted
Turkish integration into the Western security system since the
Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkish membership in NATO (1952).
And, today Turkish participation in NATO remains important, not
only for Europe and the Middle East, but for the strategic
interests of the United States. Operations DESERT STORM and
PROVIDE COMFORT manifestly displayed the strategic importance,
not only of Turkey's NATO membership, but also of its partnership
with the United States.
Similarly, as our analysis will show, the United States
actively supported Turkey's self-chosen efforts to play the role
of vanguard and model for the new republics of the former USSR in
order to stave off the threat of Islamic radicalism or of Iranian
influence. Moreover, Turkey continues to justify its importance
to Washington and Europe, e.g. the EU and WEU, in terms of its
`immense influence' over the region that it can deploy against
religious radicalism or related dangers.
If those claims are true, then Turkey's strenuous efforts to
play a leading role in the new world order will redound to
Ankara's and Washington's benefits. But, if Turkish claims are
overdrawn and Turkey cannot effectively shape the outlines of the
new order, then Washington, to the extent that it promoted
Turkish involvement abroad, will be implicated in Turkey's
subsequent failure to sustain its position. For this reason, and
due to its central geographical location, Turkey remains a key
strategic partner of the United States and its success or failure
will directly affect the national interests of the United States.
The authors, therefore, frame their analyses in terms of
Turkish policies and their implications for U.S. policy.
Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, USA analyzes Turkey's
position and policies vis-a-vis European organizations, i.e., EU,
WEU, and NATO, and assesses Turkey's place in the current Balkan
crisis. Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere analyzes Turkey's engagement in
a key area where U.S. troops are actually engaged, i.e. our
position helping the Kurds and the impact that the Kurdish issue
has for Turco-Iranian, Turco-Iraqi, and U.S.-Turkish relations.
Finally, Dr. Stephen J. Blank analyzes Turkish policy toward the
areas opened up by the fall of Communist power and the USSR: the
Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. This analysis also
takes account of the dilemmas facing Turkey as a result of the
Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh that is taking place
just over the border from Turkey. The authors conclude the
analysis with recommendations for action in U.S. policy towards
Turkey.

CHAPTER 2
TURKEY AND EUROPE:
EXPECTATIONS AND COMPLICATIONS
Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of communism in Europe and the peaceful
implosion of the Soviet Union have dramatically altered Turkey's
security environment, and, hence, Ankara's relations with Europe.
As seven-time prime minister and now President of Turkey Suleyman
Demirel concluded:
Turkey's position today in this part of the world is
much more important [than] it was two years ago....
Reconsidered defense, security, diplomatic, and
economic ties with Turkey are `needed more than ever.'1
Such sentiments echo throughout Turkey. As Steve Coll of The
Washington Post pointed out, "While others may debate Turkey's
importance...its own political and business elite is convinced
that the Cold War's demise offers them a new place in the sun."2
Paradoxically, Turkish political scientist Duygu Sezer has noted
that "the network of relations that Turkey built with Western
Europe at the height of the Cold War seems to have entered a
state of paralysis, if not dissolution...,"3 and concluded that
Turkish leaders will have to adapt to the new circumstances.
Given the scope and suddenness of the changes that Turkey
must face, Turkish leaders find themselves at a critical
crossroads. They must reexamine Turkey's relationship with Europe
in light of the significant opportunities--and challenges-offered by the end of the bipolar world. This reevaluation will
demand not only that Turks reconsider their role in Europe, but
that Turkey's European allies and the United States review their
relations with Turkey.
This reassessment will occur as the United States finds
itself facing a conundrum. On the one hand, the United States has
interests that argue for strong U.S. support of Turkish goals of
increased integration in European political, economic, and
security organizations. On the other, strong U.S. support of
Turkish initiatives to facilitate increased integration with
Europe could alienate other U.S. European allies who may hesitate
to grant Turkey increased access to European institutions.
Similarly, while U.S.-Turkish interests along NATO's southern
tier, in Transcaucasia, and in Central Asia are frequently
complementary, they are not coincidental and are sometimes in
conflict. The key question for U.S. policymakers, therefore,
becomes: How does the United States balance these frequently
conflicting interests?

The first purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to identify
future Turkish goals in Europe, deduce the likelihood of those
objectives being attained, and assess the implications of Turkish
policies regarding Europe. More importantly, from a U.S.
perspective, the essay also examines potential consequences for
U.S. interests in Turkey and Europe that may emerge as a result
of Turkey redefining its relationships vis-a-vis Europe.
TURKISH GOALS IN EUROPE
Turkey's immediate objectives in Europe will likely be
little changed: ensure the territorial integrity and security of
the Republic of Turkey and increase integration with European
institutions to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal
modernization. But, it is important to realize that even though
the Turks will pursue parallel political, economic, and security
policies for their own rewards, the primary drive is not simply
improved political, economic, and security conditions. Put
simply, the overriding Turkish goal will be increased integration
with Europe; to be seen and to be perceived as being European.
The question remains, however, whether Ankara will be able to
achieve its goals or will be willing to pay the economic and
political price that may be required. The consequences of the
success or failure of these initiatives, particularly their
implications for Turkish and U.S. policies, will be the subject
of the discussion that follows.
Turkish Membership in the European Union.
One of the best ways to ensure increased integration with
Europe is full Turkish membership in the European Union (EU)
(formerly European Community [EC]). This is not a new idea, as
the Turks entered into an associate status with the EC in 1963
that was designed to provide Turkey with the time to prepare for
the rigors of full membership, for which Turkey formally applied
in 1987.4 But, the recent Maastricht Treaty for European Union
has added increased impetus for Turkey to join before, in the
words of Duygu Sezer, it is "...reduced to a non-European country
on the fringes of Europe...."5
Whether Turkey will be able to fulfill its goal of full EU
membership remains to be seen. Among Turkish elites, many
understand that Turkey's journey to full membership in the EU may
be longer than some expect.6 A critical question for Turks,
however, is not if Turkey can meet its obligations, but whether
Europe will live up to its part of the bargain. When Turkey
formally applied for EC membership in December 1987, the EC
Commission informed Ankara that the matter could not be
considered before 1993.7 As many in Turkey have noted, 1993 has
come "but the signals from Western Europe do not seem
promising."8 Thus, only one third of participants in the sweeping
study, "Turkey in 2020," believe that Turkey will actually be a
member of the EU by 2020.9

The primary reason behind this gloomy forecast is that many
of those surveyed agreed with politician Haluk Ozdalga's
conclusion that "the EC in essence is a community of common
culture and political principles rather than an organization of
economic cooperation."10 Or, more pointedly, as Turkish political
sociologist Nur Vergin commented: "The EC's principal concern in
not admitting Turkey is that `Turks will overwhelm them.'"11
Thus, many leading Turkish intellectual and political leaders are
skeptical that the EU will treat Turkey fairly, and are convinced
that once Turkey overcomes existing hurdles to EU membership, new
ones will emerge.12
These continued obstacles to full Turkish membership are
particularly galling to the Turks, given their efforts to attain
EU standards, the acceptance of Greece into the EC in 1981, and
Turkish support of the allied coalition--with its many EC
members--during the Gulf War with Iraq (1991).13 Especially
frustrating is the likelihood that several former neutrals
(Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), and, perhaps, even
former members of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, or
the Czech Republic) might "jump the queue" and gain membership
ahead of Turkey.14
Facing these obstacles, some prominent Turks have begun to
question the long cherished dream of Turkish entry into the EU.
Cem Boyner noted in 1991 that the cost of joining the EU may be
too high. This is particularly true, he noted, because "there is
no place affectionately reserved for us in that organization." He
also noted that Turks have placed too much emphasis on joining
the EU: "Had we not posed our entry into the EC as a matter of
life or death, perhaps we would not have these problems today."15
Intellectuals' Hearth President Nevzat Yalcintas echoed these
conclusions noting, "I have always seen integration with the EC
as a romantic and unrealistic policy that wastes Turkey's
time."16
Nonetheless, political leaders in Ankara and many moderates
in Turkish society have invested a good deal of political and
personal capital in Turkey's membership in the EU. If the EU
fails to grant Turkey full membership, then moderates may lose
out in Turkey. This is especially true if Turkey meets existing
requirements and perceives it is being denied membership because
of racial, religious, or cultural differences or because Western
Europeans fear being swamped by a wave of Turkish immigrant
workers.17 Nor are Turkish fears overworked, for as Bruce
Kuniholm has pointed out, "many Europeans privately express
enormous doubts about Turkey's achieving membership in the near
future."18 Should the EU reject Turkey, a considerable backlash
against Europe is likely to occur and could lead Turkey to turn
toward Central Asia and the Middle East--an outcome in neither
Turkish nor U.S. interests.19
Two sets of bilateral relations are critical for Turkish

entry into the EU and deserve brief comment. The first concerns
Germany, which exerts tremendous influence within the EU.
Historically, Germany and Turkey have enjoyed close affiliation;
however, four issues recently have clouded German-Turkish
relations. First, hesitant German support of Turkey during
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM angered many Turks and
set relations on edge.20 Second, the temporary suspension of
German military aid to Turkey because previously supplied
equipment had been used to suppress the Kurdish Workers' Party
(PKK)-led insurgency in southeastern Turkey incensed many Turks
who see the PKK threatening Turkish territorial integrity.21
Third, the German government's permissive attitude toward
PKK activities in Germany has allowed the PKK a relatively safe
base for operations against Turkish government and business
interests in Europe and is further taxing Bonn's relations with
Ankara.22 A recent example of such operations was the wave of
violent PKK demonstrations, occupations of buildings, and
hostage-taking across Europe on June 24, 1993.23 These assaults
will certainly aggravate Turks who have lobbied Germany for
increased protection of Turkish embassies and business interests,
as well as for stronger actions against the PKK. A 5-month delay
in the decision of the German government to ban the PKK has not
helped matters.24
Fourth, the rise of xenophobic groups in Germany that have
focused their sometimes deadly attacks on the 1.8 million ethnic
Turks living in Germany has also strained relations. German
government responses to right-wing violence and efforts to reform
its citizenship laws have been half-hearted, at best. Tensions
have run high as ethnic Turks in Germany have responded with
violence. Turkish government calls for protection of its citizens
or ethnic brethren and liberalization of Germany's restrictive
citizenship requirements have strained Turkish- German
relations.25 These tensions could increase if the German
government cannot end the violence.
The second key bilateral relationship concerns Greece. That
Greece and Turkey have suffered poor relations for centuries is
an understatement and requires little amplification. The catalog
of their ongoing disputes is extensive: Cyprus; control of air
and sea space in the Aegean Sea; alleged mistreatment of each
other's minorities; mutual claims of religious oppression; and
Turkish claims of Greek militarization of islands in the Aegean
in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), countered by Greek
claims that the islands are threatened by Turkish invasion.26
The prognosis of future improvement is unclear, as leading
Turkish intellectuals have diametrically opposed forecasts of
future Greek-Turkish relations. While optimists formed the
majority in the study "Turkey in 2020," strong reservations about
Greece still remain. Some of the pessimism is based on
long-standing cultural and historical differences, but many
believe differences over Aegean Sea issues and the Balkans will

block improvement in relations between the two states for the
foreseeable future.27 Perhaps most serious has been the
resentment generated by Athens' continued opposition to Turkish
entry into the EU.28 Equally important, these frustrations could
be transferred to Europe, as a whole, if Turkey does not perceive
that other EU members are exerting sufficient pressure on Greece
to allow Turkey full membership in the EU.
Despite existing and potential problems with Europe and EU
membership, many Turkish policymakers still believe they have
little option but to press ahead.29 As Ismail Kara, a noted
Muslim intellectual stated:
It would be to Turkey's disadvantage if closer
relationships with Islamic nations and Turkic republics
of the Soviet Union reduce Turkey's chances of having a
say in Europe. That would condemn Turkey to being part
of the Middle East and the Far East. The reality is
that Turkey has to work hard to have a say in Europe
despite its religious, cultural, and historic ties to
the Middle East and Far East.30
Conversely, other, more nationalistic voices can be heard.
For example, in the study "Turkey in 2020," film director Halit
Refig commented, "I think that those who believe that we have to
make our plans in accordance with the West's blueprint are
wrong."31 Political sociologist Nur Vergin takes a similar tack:
Turkey is on its way to becoming an important player in
the world stage....[and] Turks have an imperial mission
that they derive from their history and the attributes
of the land they live on....[As a result,] Europe has
stopped being a guiding beacon for Turks.32
Turkish Membership in European Security Organizations.

Turkish Security Concerns. Turks have good cause to be
apprehensive about their security. Turkey has a long history of
competition and military confrontation with Russia (not simply
the Soviet Union). While the current situation looks promising,
long historical concerns have not been overcome. The devolution
of the Soviet Union has also created considerable instability
along Turkey's northeastern frontier: civil war in Georgia and a
historically hostile Armenia engaged in a war with ethnically
Turkic Azerbaijan over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh
in Azerbaijan.
To the east and south lie Iran, Iraq, and Syria, highly
armed authoritarian regimes. Turkey supported the allied
coalition in the Gulf War against Iraq; continues to provide
bases for enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq;
and enforces economic sanctions against Baghdad. Iran and Syria
have supported anti-Turkey Kurdish groups; indeed, both nations

have aided the PKK-led insurgency and terror campaign waged since
1983.33 Finally, Iran and Turkey are engaged in intense
competition for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.34
Turks also perceive risks to European Turkey. Historic
Greek-Turkish rivalries over Thrace, perceived repression of
Greek and Turkish ethnic minorities, the festering wound of
Cyprus, and conflicts over control of Aegean air and sea space
remain, even if subdued.35 While the present regime in Bulgaria
has moderated considerably from its predecessor, significant
ill-treatment of Turkish minorities occurred as recently as
1989.36 Events in the Balkans could also draw Turkey into the
ongoing conflict, with severe implications for NATO.37
Turkey, thus, faces an active insurgency intent on
dismantling the Turkish state from within and is surrounded by a
host of potential adversaries from without. Given these security
concerns, one should not be surprised, then, that the Turks have
sought closer ties with the Western European Union (WEU). What
remains to be seen, however, is whether Turkey can gain full
membership in the WEU and achieve the degree of security it
desires.

Turkish Relations with the WEU. Under terms of the
Maastricht Treaty, the WEU will act as the defense and security
arm of the European Union.38 Recognizing the rising importance of
the WEU as the security arm of a united Europe, as well as the
basis for a European defense pillar within NATO, and that
membership in the WEU offers Turkey the opportunity to shape the
evolving European Defense Identity, Turkish leaders have devoted
considerable effort to gaining entry into that organization.
And, because WEU assistance guarantees are stronger than those of
NATO and because the Brussels Treaty is not tied to a specific
geographic area, many Turkish leaders hope that WEU membership
would bolster European support of Turkish security interests.39
Finally, and perhaps as importantly, membership in the WEU would
assist Turkey in achieving its overarching political goal of
increased integration with Europe.
Turkey has been able to achieve only associate membership in
the WEU, a result that in some ways parallels the frustrations it
has met as it seeks full membership in the EU. For example,
Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin has noted Ankara's dissatisfaction
and remarked that Turkey accepts its current status only as a
temporary measure until it achieves full membership.40
Underscoring the importance of full membership, Ian Lesser of
RAND has noted:
Turkish exclusion from these [European defense]
arrangements, regardless of their precise form, would
be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's
unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security
role on the Continent.41

Continued exclusion from the full benefits of membership within
the EC and WEU could, therefore, lead to a reduction in Turkish
interest in joining Europe and in Europe's interest in such
integration.
The path to full membership in the WEU may, however, contain
potential pitfalls for Turkey. Because of Turkey's associate
status (which may prevail for some time), the defense provisions
of the Brussels Treaty do not apply to Turkey;42 that is, members
of the WEU are not required to come to Turkey's aid in the event
of aggression against Turkish territory. At the same time,
according to the membership agreement, Turkey "...will be asked
to make a financial contribution to the Organization's
budgets."43 Thus, Turkey `enjoys' the responsibilities of the WEU
without the benefit of either the right to vote on how that money
will be spent or solid security guarantees.
Additionally, as an internal WEU report pointed out,
associate membership may actually be inimical to long-term
Turkish interests: Turkey could become enmeshed in European
issues without being able to participate fully in discussions
and, undoubtedly, not in the voting process. Certainly, under the
terms of the association agreement, Turkey has the freedom to
choose when and where to become involved, but the pressure upon
Turkey to be seen as "European" could coerce the Turks to take
actions that they might not pursue were Ankara a full member.44
For Turkey to integrate more fully in the WEU could also
require the Turks to take a more "European" view of defense and
security matters. Turkey could get caught between its desires to
satisfy the United States and its goal of fuller integration with
Europe that would require moving closer to "European" ideas and,
perhaps, away from the United States. Thus, aligning more with
European policies could create tensions within the Turkish-U.S.
bilateral relationship that might hinder attainment of U.S.
policy objectives.45

Turkish Relations Within NATO. As Bruce Kuniholm, an
authority on Turkish security issues, has pointed out,
"underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the
principle of reciprocity."46 When Turkey joined NATO, the parties
tacitly agreed that Turkey would help contain the Soviet Union.
Should deterrence have failed, Turkey would have made its
facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many
Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe. In
return, Turkey fell under the Alliance's deterrent and defense
umbrella and the Alliance provided economic and military
assistance to modernize the Turkish armed forces.47
The demise of the Soviet Union has called into question the
need to sustain this reciprocal relationship. Some Turkish
commentators question whether Europeans still consider Turkey to
be a key ingredient in the European defensive scheme.48 Other
analysts have argued that although the Soviet threat has faded,

substantial risks remain along NATO's Southern Tier, and Turkey,
in particular, has quickly become the Alliance's new front
line.49
European reluctance to comprehend the risks facing Turkey
and Turkey's rising relative importance as "point man" on NATO's
southern flank stems from several conditions. First, many NATO
members remain preoccupied with the aftermath of the unification
of Germany, the continuing economic recession in Europe,
implementation of post-Maastricht issues within the EU, and the
assimilation of the former Communist states of Central and
Eastern Europe. Second, after the long cold war, nations are
intent on realizing the "peace dividend." As a result, analysis
of security issues within many states has focused inward as
nations concentrate on forecasting minimum possible defense
expenditures, reducing their forces to conform to new spending
guidelines, redefining their security policies, and adapting
strategies to new fiscal constraints.50
Third, in the wake of the Gulf War, some European allies
have expressed concerns over involvement in "out-of-NATO area"
operations. While this debate is not new,51 its focus has
sharpened because of the volatile security conditions along
Turkey's eastern and southern borders. The Turks strongly believe
that, as Secretary of State Warren Christopher has remarked,
"Turkey lives in a rough neighborhood,"52 and that this
neighborhood falls within the NATO area. Not all of Turkey's
NATO partners are enthusiastic about helping police this area,
however.53 Some NATO members fear that a conflict between Turkey
and one of its neighbors could result in Turkey invoking the
defense clause of the Washington Treaty and drawing NATO into a
confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European
interests.54
Ironically, the Turks have their own reservations about
"out-of-NATO area" operations and do not want to get caught up in
disputes between their neighbors and their NATO allies. Turkish
leaders, for example, are concerned that NATO allies will demand
use of Turkish bases and NATO infrastructure (communications,
logistics, etc.) within Turkey to conduct operations that may not
be in accord with Turkey's national interests as a regional power
or that operations might be carried out against another Islamic
state.55
Turkey, therefore, is in a dilemma. Turkey hesitates to
support its NATO allies in controversies along its borders that
it would rather avoid (such as Operations POISED HAMMER and
PROVIDE COMFORT),56 but strongly wants NATO to safeguard Turkish
security against the instability that boils along its borders.
Given these circumstances, it would appear logical for Turkey to
resolve this dilemma through deeper bilateral relations with the
United States.
TURKISH-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS

Turkish-U.S. security relations are also undergoing
reexamination, due as much to Turkish as American motivations. In
the wake of the Gulf War, for example, Chief of the Turkish
General Staff, General Dogan Gures noted that cooperation with
the United States "has slowed down." Specifically, Gures stated:
The United States suggested storing military material
and equipment at the bases in Turkey for emergency
operations. The project has not been taken up
seriously. The matter is very sensitive, and, because
of this, it is also being taken up at the political
level. Work here has also slowed, and the matter has
not been placed on the agenda. We know that U.S. aid
could be reduced, so we have drawn up measures to deal
with that eventuality.57
Continued U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military pressure
on Iraq and support of the Kurds in northern Iraq have increased
the distance that some Turks feel toward the United States. As
The Wall Street Journal noted,
Spend time in Turkey today, and what you'll hear is
increasing criticism of the U.S. military presence at
Incirlik air base, which is central to U.S. efforts to
maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, which still
supplies most of the West's energy needs.58
The Wall Street Journal questioned whether such comments marked a
critical decline in Turkish-U.S. relations, but did note that
"... serious people wouldn't ignore the possibility."59
Such criticisms also preceded recent congressional
reductions in U.S. military assistance to Turkey that will
undoubtedly exacerbate tensions. First, Congress reduced the Bush
administration's last proposed budget allocation for military aid
to Turkey from $543 million to $450 million. Second, and more
importantly, Congress converted the money from outright grants to
loan credits.60 These actions invoked considerable adverse
commentary from Turkey, which is in the midst of a multi-year,
multi-billion dollar modernization program of its armed forces.
Moreover, Turkey currently has roughly a $7.5 billion debt in
foreign military sales to the United States, as well as a total
foreign debt of approximately $40 billion,61 and another $450
million in loans will not help matters. As a result, the Turks
perceive that their nation's long contributions to NATO, support
of the U.S.-led coalition during the Gulf War, and, especially,
their difficult economic sacrifices in support of the embargo of
Iraq have not been adequately recognized by the United States.
Consequently, Turkish leaders have called for the revision of the
U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980
(DECA).62
Originally intended to last 5 years, the DECA has been

repeatedly extended and is due to expire at the end of 1993. The
DECA stipulated that "... The United States will exert its best
efforts to provide mutually agreed upon financial and technical
assistance to Turkey's development efforts," and that "... the
United States shall use its best efforts to provide the Republic
of Turkey with defense equipment, services, and training, in
accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon [emphasis
added]."63 Apparently, Turkish political leaders no longer
perceive that the United States is offering "its best efforts."
As one unnamed Turkish official noted,
Washington made a number of promises when it extended
DECA in the past. However, it failed to realize them.
That is a point that should be considered in the
talks.64
In an attempt to ensure future "U.S. best efforts," Turkish
officials have demanded that yearly military aid guarantees be
included in the next version of the DECA. The reported U.S.
response to this demand has unsettled the Turkish diplomatic
community. According to unnamed officials of the Turkish General
Staff participating in the negotiations, their U.S. counterpart
replied that "the United States will be forced to close down its
bases in Turkey if Ankara insists that the military aid it
receives from the United States should be guaranteed."65 Such
blunt diplomatic language caused consternation within Turkish
policy-making bodies, particularly military circles, which
undoubtedly will have an effect on Turkish perceptions of the
extent of the U.S. commitment to Turkish security concerns.
Perceived U.S. treatment of Turkey may not be the sole
motivating factor behind Turkey's decision to review its
bilateral relations with the United States. Indeed, over-reliance
on the United States may not be in Turkey's long-term interests.
As Duygu Sezer remarked in 1989: "a bilateral military
relationship with the U.S. would turn Turkey ... into a lonely
military outpost of Europe, while Western Europe closed itself
into a United Europe." Sezer also concluded that such close
bilateral relationship with the United States would play into the
hands of religious fundamentalists in Turkey, "... for it would
be seen as a defeat for the pro-Western modernists."66 Thus, for
Turkey, a two-pronged approach that includes the United States,
but continues to focus on European security arrangements will be
essential for future Turkish security and political vitality.
THE BALKANS: IMPEDIMENT TO TURKISH INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE
The ongoing crisis in the Balkans could derail Turkish
objectives of increased integration with Europe. Turks have
strong ties to their Muslim co-religionists throughout the
Balkans that pull them toward intervention in the war in
Yugoslavia. As a result of the Ottomans' long and oppressive
occupation, however, few states in the region are willing to
permit a physical Turkish presence in the Balkans outside of

Turkey.67 Consequently, Ankara is constrained from assisting
ethnic Turks or Muslims in the Balkans to the degree it feels
necessary, and a certain amount of frustration--to be added to
those already addressed--has resulted.
Turkish intervention in the ongoing crisis could generate a
severe backlash within Europe. At the least, full Turkish
membership in the EU or WEU could be delayed because of Greek
objections to Turkish activities. At the worst, Greece and Turkey
could be drawn into opposing sides of the conflict. Such a
situation could irreparably set back further Turkish integration
with Europe, result in the unravelling of NATO, or prevent the
further integration of Central and Eastern Europe with West
European organizations. Such intervention, while not likely in
the foreseeable future, cannot be dismissed out of hand and could
occur in a number of ways.
The first instance could be Turkish involvement in the
current conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Muslims make up
approximately 44 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's population68 and
have been the primary object of Croatian and Serbian aggression.
For nearly 2 years, the Turks have reiterated their historic and
legal responsibilities for safeguarding Muslim populations in the
Balkans, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Albania.69 For
example, the Turkish General National Assembly noted in August
1992 that it would not accept any forcible changes to the borders
of Bosnia-Hercegovina and that:
The TGNA will consider it a humanitarian duty to take
every kind of step to stop the Serbian attacks for the
protection of the people and territorial integrity of
Bosnia-Hercegovina in case the international use of
force is delayed.70
As late as February 1993, then Turkish President Turgut Ozal
restated his position that Turkey "is responsible for looking
after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans."71
Turkish frustrations over the lack of European or U.N.
action to protect the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina have been
building, and Turkish leaders have become increasingly critical
of perceived Western equivocation.72 These tensions have been
eased somewhat by Turkish participation in the enforcement of the
"no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina, and in the naval forces in
the Adriatic Sea enforcing U.N. sanctions,73 but it remains to be
seen how long these relatively limited actions will assuage
Turkish public opinion. Indeed, even with these actions, some
Turkish leaders have endorsed a more strident approach. For
example, Necmet Erbakan, leader of the Turkish Prosperity Party,
has declared that "If we come to power, we will do in Bosnia what
we did in Cyprus,"74 alluding to the 1974 Turkish invasion of
northern Cyprus.
While an outright Turkish invasion in support of their

co-religionists in Bosnia-Hercegovina is highly unlikely,
accounts of clandestine Turkish military aid have surfaced
repeatedly. For example, an anonymous source associated with the
Turkish General Staff has confirmed reports that upwards of 1,000
soldiers have been prepared for covert deployment to Bosnia to
aid Muslim forces.75 Thus, even if the Turks do not officially
intervene, their actions may be sufficient to cause a reaction
from other parties within the region that affects overall Turkish
relations in Europe. Moreover, even unfounded rumors of such
preparations are sufficient to raise suspicions among Turkey's
Balkan neighbors.
Despite the volatile situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the
level of some Turkish rhetoric, the chance of substantial overt
Turkish intervention is relatively small because reactions would
imperil overall Turkish political goals in Europe. Should the
conflict spread to Macedonia (where, it should be recalled, the
United States has deployed 500 troops as U.N. observers), Kosovo,
or Albania, however, Turkey could be drawn into a war that has
the potential to quickly escalate and engulf the entire Balkan
Peninsula.
Roughly one third of Macedonia's population is Muslim and it
has close ties with Turkey. To underscore the importance of
Turkish support of Macedonia, the late President Ozal discussed
Turkish military assistance to Macedonia during his February 1993
visit to Skopje.76 Thus, Serbian attacks against the Muslim
population of Macedonia, especially following the depredations
against Bosnian Muslims, would undoubtedly bring a strong Turkish
reaction.77
Bulgaria could also be drawn into the conflict should it
spread to Macedonia. Bulgaria has historically coveted Macedonia;
indeed, Bulgaria participated in four wars in the last century in
failed attempts to incorporate Macedonia into a "Greater
Bulgaria."78 Sofia also considers itself to be Macedonia's
guardian from Serbia, Greece, and Turkey. Although Sofia has
followed a cautious policy to date, any intervention by one of
those parties would bring about a Bulgarian reaction that would
almost certainly result in Turkish entry into the conflict.79
Bulgarian actions in Macedonia also would likely precipitate
Greek counteraction. Greece has long-standing historical claims
to portions of Macedonia, and is intent on preventing the
Bulgarians or Turks from expanding their territory or position
there.80 Greece is particularly concerned about Turkish
penetration into the Balkans. As The Wall Street Journal pointed
out, "any Turkish return to the Balkan nations it once ruled
would enflame Greece, its ancient rival, which is preparing to
deploy 35,000 troops on its border with Macedonia."81
Turkish or Bulgarian actions or intervention in Macedonia
may not be required to cause Greek intervention in Macedonian
affairs. Athens has become almost paranoid about Macedonia--as

Greek histrionics over the name, Macedonia, clearly indicate.82
Indeed, the "Macedonia Issue" contributed significantly to the
defeat of the government led by Constantine Mitsotakis in the
October 1993 elections.83 Although unlikely, the potential
exists that Greece could take unilateral action against Macedonia
to preclude such an outcome, which could bring Turkey and,
possibly, Bulgaria into the conflict.
The situation is more explosive in the Kosovo region of
Serbia. Although 90 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian
and Muslim, Kosovo is part of Serbia and Serbian nationalism has
raised Kosovo to the status of a holy place. The region is
virtually occupied by the Serbian Army which is exercising
oppressive martial law, as well as conducting a vicious campaign
designed to drive out ethnic Albanians.84 As a result, many
observers have concluded that it is only a matter of time until
the Serbs extend their "ethnic cleansing" campaign to Kosovo.85
Even should the Serbs not initiate action, the situation has
grown so tense and Albanian minorities have become so oppressed
that it is possible that Albanian Kosovar nationalists might take
steps to provoke or precipitate a Serbian action to bring about a
response from the other regional powers.86
A worst case scenario for an expansion of the ongoing Balkan
conflict could unfold as follows. Regardless of cause, the Serbs
begin ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Albania, despite a desire to
avoid war at all costs, might feel compelled to take action to
assist its brethren in Kosovo.87 In turn, the Serbs retaliate
against Albania. Given that Turkey and Albania have existing-but publicly unspecified--defense arrangements,88 Turkey could
then likely become involved in the conflict. This would
undoubtedly bring Greece, and probably Bulgaria, into the
conflict, as well.89
Even if Turkey did not initially become involved, Macedonia-with its own sizeable Albanian minority, large Muslim population
(roughly one third), and fear that it might be the next target of
Serbian aggression--could be drawn into the conflict.90 The
combination of Macedonian and Albanian participation would
undoubtedly elicit Turkey's participation also. Should either
Macedonia or Turkey become involved, Greece and Bulgaria would
feel compelled to enter the fray to protect their nationalist
interests. Thus, Kosovo holds the high potential of striking the
spark that sets the Balkans ablaze once again.91
Continuation of the war in the former Yugoslavia will
complicate the achievement of Turkish goals in Europe. To date,
Ankara has displayed tremendous patience with the situation in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. How long the Turks will be able to retain
that patience remains to be seen. But, given the stakes involved,
particularly their keen desires for increased integration with
Europe, it is likely that Turkish initiatives will remain
restricted to rhetoric. That said, should the situation in
Bosnia-Hercegovina dramatically worsen, the Turks may feel

compelled to action, even at the risk of jeopardizing their
overall position in Europe. At the very least, Turkish
frustrations with Europe and the United States may increase and
exert effects in other areas (e.g., Iraq, Transcaucasia, or
Central Asia).
Should the war expand beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina into
Macedonia or Kosovo, Turkish national interests will be more
fully engaged in Balkan, as opposed to pan-European, issues. The
Turks will be faced with extremely difficult choices concerning
the price they are willing to pay for fuller integration with
Europe. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo or aggression against
Macedonia, without what the Turks perceive to be adequate U.N.,
European, or U.S. responses, may force Turkey to intervene,
despite the costs in European integration that might be involved.
Certainly, those costs could be extremely high, and Turkey will
carefully weigh its options.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Turkey has discovered itself in a new, unfamiliar world,
"and facing it, Turkey finds itself alone--philosophically,
politically, and militarily."92 Turkish leaders have been
uncomfortable in such an isolated position and have sought ways
to extricate Turkey from its predicament. The path they have
chosen relies predominantly on increased integration with Europe.
While this conforms with Turkey's traditional approach to
ensuring Turkish security and modernization goals, it presumes
that Europe will accommodate Turkish aspirations.
Whether Europe will fully satisfy Turkish expectations is an
open question. Turkey faces considerable hurdles in achieving its
goal of full integration in the European community and European
Union. The Ottoman past remains a sticking point in
Turkish-European relations and significant religious, racial, and
cultural differences compound historical difficulties. European
concerns over the pace of human rights reform in Turkey, and the
gap between European and Turkish economic capabilities may
present difficult barriers to overcome in the short term.
Turkish security concerns are real, but Ankara should not
look to the WEU for increased support. That said, and despite its
drawbacks, associate membership in the WEU is probably the best
Turkey can achieve in the short term and Turkish leaders will
have to live with the frustrations of not achieving full
membership. The Turks can take solace that associate membership
at least gets their foot in the door, so to speak, and offers an
increased opportunity to participate in the debates that will
shape the future European security environment. Moreover, as the
WEU expands its role as the security arm of the EU, Turkey may
also be able to make its influence felt in that body.
Nonetheless, these conditions likely will not satisfy Turkish
leaders and future seeds of discontent will be sown unless Turkey
achieves full membership.

Closer security relations with the United States, although
not desirable to the Turks in many ways, may have to compensate
for the lack of support from NATO or the WEU. If European
security organizations fail to meet Turkish expectations, the
United States may have to assume a larger part of the burden of
providing security assistance to Turkey. If the United States is
unwilling to accept this charge, Turkey could turn its back on
Europe and focus its energies on the Middle East or Central Asia.
This would be a tremendous setback for the West, and the United
States should exert all possible leverage to persuade Europeans
to accommodate Turkish concerns.
These issues will also be complicated by Turkey's new
approach to the world. Turks have a great deal of energy and
potential that they want to use. Already, signs indicate a
growing Turkish awareness of its regional, as well as world,
importance and a desire to pursue a more independent policy line
in accordance with its newly perceived status. Ankara, therefore,
may take stronger, more independent positions than its U.S. and
European allies have been accustomed.
U.S. interests may dictate that the United States strongly
supports Turkish initiatives. The United States and Turkey have
complementary interests in Europe, and Turkish membership in the
EU, WEU, and other European organizations offers the possibility
of the United States being able to exert indirect influence in
the crucial institutions of Europe. At the least, having a close
ally such as Turkey "sitting at the European table" will offer
the United States a measure of influence that it might not be
able to exert independently. Additionally, the United States and
Turkey also have parallel interests in Transcaucasia, Central
Asia, and the Middle East, areas where Turkey could exert
significant influence on the behalf of the United States in
return for U.S. support of Turkish goals in Europe.
If levels of future European integration fall short of
Turkey's goals but are sufficient to meet Turkey's perceived
minimum requirements (i.e., increased access to European markets
and further evolution of Turkey's associate membership in the
WEU), Turkey could remain content with its level of participation
in Europe. But, if the extent of European integration does not
meet Turkish expectations, particularly in terms of security
arrangements, then Turkey will undoubtedly seek assistance from
the United States.
The type of assistance requested from the United States may
vary. Ankara might press Washington to support Turkey's position
in Europe. While not exactly coincidental, U.S. and Turkish
interests within Europe are largely compatible and, on the
surface, should not present significant difficulties. The one key
exception to this general rule could be the Balkans where,
because of its Islamic heritage and strong national interests,
Turkey may feel compelled to take actions contrary to U.S.

interests. To date, Turkey has displayed considerable patience
with the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, but that patience may be
wearing thin.
The problem more likely to surface is that many of Turkey's
goals in Europe conflict with desires of U.S. allies in Europe.
This places the United States in a dilemma. For example, Turkey
could ask the United States to bring pressure on their common
allies to achieve Turkish goals of full membership in the EU or
WEU as quid pro quo for Turkish support of U.S. policies outside
of Europe (e.g., U.S. access to Incirlik, support of an operation
similar to Operation DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, or counterweight to
Syrian or Iranian hegemonic designs in the Middle East.)93 Or,
Turkey could request U.S. support of critical Turkish bilateral
interests, such as pressure on the German government to ensure
the safety of its ethnic Turk minority, as well as ease Turkish
assimilation in German society through less stringent citizenship
requirements. Alternatively, the Turks could seek U.S.
initiatives to help resolve the Cyprus question, broker an
agreement for ending Aegean air and sea territorial disputes, or
improve treatment of Turkish minorities in Greece.
All of these issues will be difficult to resolve. Given the
hardened stand of many nations over these complex matters, the
degree of pressure required to provide effective assistance to
Ankara is likely to require a level of effort that would alienate
other U.S. European allies. Thus, the United States could face a
difficult choice: support Turkey and risk alienating its European
allies or not support Turkish initiatives in Europe and
jeopardize bilateral relations with Ankara at a critical time
when Turkey supports U.S. interests not only in Europe, but also
the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
If Turkey fails to achieve full membership in the EC and
WEU, Turkish leaders would likely seek improved or expanded
bilateral relations with the United States. Undoubtedly, Ankara
will desire continued economic aid, particularly military aid
that contributes to the timely completion of Turkey's 10 year
modernization program of its armed forces. Turkey may also look
to the United States to open wider its markets to Turkish goods
and services that will support the general modernization of
Turkish industry and society.
Nor may the United States be able to deny Turkey such
assistance. As the United States shifts to a regional strategy,
Turkey may possess considerable leverage in future relations with
the United States. Turkish support of U.S. interests, or at least
pursuit of complementary objectives (such as in Central Asia or
the Middle East), could benefit the United States. In the
economic arena, greater and faster Turkish economic success could
bolster Russian and Ukrainian economies, which could translate
into greater overall stability in Europe.
Thus, the United States may face difficult choices in the

midst of redefining its world role and the strategy to effect
that role. This review also comes at a time when U.S. leaders are
focusing more sharply on domestic issues and are spending less
time on foreign affairs. The United States also finds its
resources stretched, which in this context translates into
increasingly constrained military and foreign aid funds. The
United States, therefore, may be forced to reevaluate its
priorities--continue its past policies emphasizing Central Europe
or concentrate more on Turkey?
Should Turkish expectations of fuller integration with
European political, economic, and security institutions go
unfulfilled, Turkey could turn its back on Europe and focus on
developing relations in the Middle East and Central Asia. Should
this occur, the United States may be called upon to bolster
Turkey's economic and security interests. This may require the
United States to support new Turkish initiatives in Central Asia,
an area that, heretofore, has been marginal to U.S. interests.
Alternatively, the United States could become more embroiled in
the Kurdish issue or entangled in local disputes in the Middle
East. These new burdens could arrive at a time when the United
States appears uncertain of its role in Europe,94 and the Clinton
administration may find it difficult to generate the public or
congressional support that may be necessary to satisfy Turkish
expectations.
European, U.S., and Turkish interests will be best served if
Turkey remains engaged in Europe. Unfortunately, Europeans may
not take the steps necessary to ensure continued Turkish
integration. If these issues are not resolved and Turkey
disengages from Europe, European and, more importantly, U.S.
interests in Europe, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the
Middle East will suffer. Thus, it is incumbent upon the United
States to take steps to preclude such an eventuality.
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
The United States must continue to encourage its European
allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war
security environment, to include greater participation in
European political and security organizations. More than
rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken
to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance
and to assuage Turkish anxieties. The following initiatives
represent potential actions that the United States should
undertake.
Economic Initiatives.
• Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's
eventual membership in the EU. For example,
-- Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.

-- Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to
optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive existing foreign
military sales debts.
-- Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly
concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey
overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.
-- Encourage greater private American investment in
Turkey.
Diplomatic Initiatives.
• Bring influence to bear on European allies to overcome
obstacles to full Turkish membership in pan-European institutions
such as the WEU and EU.
• Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to
maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and
citizenship requirements.
• Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the
outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.
Security Initiatives.
• Continue to support Turkey's military modernization
program.
-- As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw
down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish
military capabilities.
-- Provide military assistance grants as opposed to
credits.
-- Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10
military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does
not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position
vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit
analysis may be in order.
• The United States must exert influence in NATO that
ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,
-- Ensure continued funding of existing and planned
NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey. This will require
Congress to appropriate more money to support the NATO
infrastructure fund than it has shown itself willing to do in the
post-cold war era.
-- Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey

that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish
forces. This may require reducing funds available within the
Central Region.
-- Increase Turkish command and staff officer
representation in appropriate NATO commands (e.g., NATO
headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).
-- While recognizing the political difficulties
involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to
have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South
located in Turkey.
-- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could
increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.
• Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships,
the United States should pursue security initiatives in a
multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:
-- Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior
partner.
-- Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are
continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be
used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic
importance of Turkey.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE KURDISH CONNECTION
Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere
INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter has shown, Turkey has for many years
been focused on Europe. It has been attempting to integrate
itself into the European community. As part of that intention, it
has virtually turned its back on the Middle East, even though for
centuries Turkey was predominantly a Middle East power.1
It is ironic in this respect that today the principal threat
to Turkey's security originates in the Middle East. Radical
groups, which are carrying out subversive operations against the
Turkish state, are based there. The author is referring, of
course, to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hizbollah. These
groups have within recent years mounted a formidable threat to
Turkey's internal security. The activity of the PKK in particular
has been such that, in the eyes of many, unless checked, the PKK
will push Turkey into a civil war.2
This chapter will describe the origin of the PKK-directed
threat to Turkey. It will show that the PKK, and the other
radical organizations working with it, are the agents of Syria
and Iran, and that the radical states promoted these groups to
block what they perceived to be NATO advances in the region.
The chapter will further show that Syria and Iran look on
Turkey as a Trojan Horse whereby NATO is penetrating areas the
radicals claim as their sphere of influence. Weak as they are,
Damascus and Tehran are incapable of mounting a conventional
military threat to Ankara, and therefore they rely on indirect
power. They use terror as a means of harassing Turkey and to
discourage it from taking actions which the radicals deplore.
For example, in June of this year, 29 Turkish embassies and
missions in Europe were attached by the PKK.3 This wave of
violence that swept across Europe was promoted by Iran and, to a
lesser degree, Syria, this chapter will argue. The aim of the
attacks was to get Turkey to withdraw its support from Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT.
PROVIDE COMFORT, as is well known, represents an effort by
the United States to protect the Kurds from the wrath of Saddam
Husayn.4 To Syria and Iran, however, it is something more
sinister. They see it as a thinly contrived effort on the part of
Turkey and the United States to establish a permanent NATO
military presence in the region, targeted on the Gulf.

Fear of NATO intervention on the part of the radicals goes
back many years. This chapter begins with an examination of how
Syria and Iran first developed their fears about NATO, and of
Turkey's alleged role as a NATO agent in the Middle East.
THE TERROR WAR AGAINST TURKEY
In December 1982 forces from nations belonging to NATO
entered Lebanon to separate warring Israelis and Arabs. They did
not come as NATO representatives. Indeed, no connection between
them and the Alliance was claimed; the units were officially
described as the Multi-National Force (MNF). Syria and Iran,
however, did not believe this distinction. To them, these were
NATO troops and they were coming to help Israel take over the
Levant. As a consequence of this perception, the radicals
mobilized against the intervention.5
The story of the terror war in Lebanon is so well known it
need not be recounted here. However, what is not known,
generally, is that Syria and Iran waged a similar campaign
against Turkey. Starting in 1983, Damascus and Tehran used
Kurdish and Armenian (and some Arab) assets to combat Ankara, and
they did it because, in their eyes, Turkey was subverting the
northern Gulf by helping NATO establish a military presence
there.
Fears in Damascus and Tehran had been aroused by NATO
maneuvers in southeastern Anatolia,6 which took place in June
1983. During these exercises, Turkish units crossed into Iraq on
a mission that has never been adequately explained. Turkey
claimed at the time that it was going after "bandits."7 However
this may be, the action was seen to benefit Iraq. Baghdad could
barely police its northern provinces at this time, and having
Turkey, in effect, do the job for it, was an enormous help.8
The fact that Turkey would seemingly abandon its professed
neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War deeply disturbed Syria's
President Hafez Assad.9 He viewed Iraq's President Saddam Hussein
as his arch rival, and had done everything in his power to topple
the Iraqi leader.
Now, not only was Turkey coming to Iraq's aid militarily,
there were other equally disturbing developments. Starting in
1982, it became obvious that Washington and Baghdad were moving
toward a rapprochement. The two had severed diplomatic relations
in 1967, and for years Iraq was considered among the inveterate
foes of both Tel Aviv and Washington.
In 1982, however, Congressman Stephen Solarz, a foremost
champion of Israel, visited Baghdad, after which Saddam publicly
expressed his belief that Israel was entitled to secure borders
in the Middle East. Right after that Saddam ejected several
terrorist groups from Baghdad, including the notorious Abu Nidal

organization. This opened the way for the U.S. State Department
to remove Iraq from its list of nations supporting terrorism, and
a relatively short time later Washington and Baghdad exchanged
ambassadors.10
Obviously these moves threatened Syria's position. In
effect, this was a throwback to the days of the Baghdad Pact,
when the United States had what appeared to be an unassailable
position in the Gulf.11 Hence, Assad (and the Khomeini regime as
well) devised a counter-strategy to offset these developments.
This was the start of the terror war mounted by Syria and
Iran against Turkey (and to a lesser degree Baghdad.)12 The
principal agents in this war were the Kurdish pesh merga
(guerrilla fighters who inhabit geographical Kurdistan), and
specifically the PKK, which at this time was a virtually unknown
organization. We will now look at how the PKK progressed, under
the tutelage of Syria and Iran, from a nonentity to become one
the most feared terrorist organizations in the Middle East, and
the principal threat to Turkey's stability today.
THE RISE OF THE PKK
Turkey's history of democratic practice is in many respects
exemplary among Middle Eastern nations. In 1950 Turkey's ruling
Republican Peoples Party (RPP) held elections in which,
unexpectedly, it was defeated. It stepped down.13
In the Middle East, where ruling parties almost never give
up power voluntarily, this was an extraordinary performance.
Nonetheless, the parties that succeeded the RPP proved corrupt,14
and by the late 1970s Turkey was in the grip of a virtual civil
war, with self-proclaimed leftists and rightists battling each
other in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. Finally, Turkey's
army intervened, drove the civilian government from power, and
purged Turkey of the many radical groups.15
One of the groups thus forced into exile was the PKK, which
professed to be the vanguard of the Kurdish separatist movement
in Turkey. This was a grand boast; in fact the PKK at this time
had little following. Turkey has a large Kurdish population (of
over 10 million),16 but, in the late 1960s, this population was
not active politically.17 Hence, the PKK claimed the title of
leader of the Turkish-Kurdish resistance by default--there was no
other significant Turkish-Kurdish opposition, or none, at any
rate, that espoused separatism.18
The PKK comprised mainly lower class ghetto youths,
self-styled Marxists. This was the time of the Maoist Revolution,
and youths throughout the world were embracing China's conception
of Marxist ideology. Like a lot of other youth groups at the
time, the PKK's understanding of Marxism was dim--as evidenced by
its program, which called for little else than "emancipating"
southeastern Anatolia (the home of Turkey's Kurdish community).

As to what would occur once liberation was secured--the PKK
cadres seemed unsure.19
The PKK, after being purged by Turkey's army, fled to Syria
where Assad took it under his protection.20 In 1983, he selected
this group to participate in, and ultimately to lead, the terror
war against Turkey.21
Assad first, however, had to move the PKK into a position
where it could act, and for this he turned to Masoud Barzani,
head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).22 This was an
Iraqi-Kurdish group that participated in Iran's 1983 invasion of
northern Iraq. Afterward, the KDP guerrillas had infiltrated Iraq
along the Turkish border, and established bases there.
Assad wanted Barzani to take the PKK under his wing so that
the group could use his bases to infiltrate southeastern Turkey
and stir up a popular revolt. Barzani initially declined, for
fear of antagonizing the Turks.23 His father, Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, had led the Kurdish revolt against Baghdad from 1961
until 1975, and during that time had made it a rule always to
cooperate with Ankara. Indeed, the elder Mulla Mustafa had gone
so far as to assist the Turkish army in its repression of rebel
Turkish-Kurds. Ultimately, however, Assad prevailed, and the PKK
cadres joined Barzani in the north.
For awhile nothing was heard of the PKK, and then in July
1984 it exploded into the headlines with a spectacular operation
that targeted two Turkish-Kurdish towns--Semdinli and Eruh. (See
Figure 1.) PKK cadres, divided into two sections, smuggled
themselves into Turkey and attacked the towns, located at widely
dispersed points in the southeast.24 This operation greatly
embarrassed the Turkish army, inasmuch as, prior to it, there had
been only minimal anti-government activity in the area.
Turkey responded by entering into an accord with Baghdad
whereby Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkish units to enter
Iraq in order to comb the northern territory for PKK
guerrillas.25 Damascus and Tehran were outraged at this agreement,
and protested against it, but being weak neither could hope to
block it. Nonetheless, they took what action they could--which
basically consisted of stepping up their assistance to the
various anti-Turkish groups; in effect, they increased their
pressure on Turkey. For example, Iran offered to provide the PKK
a base along the Iranian-Turkish border at Urmia (See Figure 1).
At the same time, it invited the ASALA to open an office in
Tehran. (Shortly after this two Turkish diplomats were slain in
the Iranian capital, an event that nearly caused a break in
diplomatic relations between Iran and Turkey.26)
From late 1984 until 1987 a tug of war went on in Iraqi
Kurdistan and southeastern Turkey, with Syria and Iran on one
side supporting the Kurdish rebels, and Iraq and Turkey seeking
to repress them. Then, in 1988, Iraq unexpectedly turned the

tables on Iran, forcing it to capitulate in its 8-year war
against Baghdad. As might be imagined, the Kurdish rebellion in
Iraq died as soon as the Iranians surrendered. The PKK forces,
however, did not go out of action. They hung on in the rugged
mountains of southeastern Turkey. They were constrained, however,
from doing much; the whole security picture in the region had
changed after Iran lost the war.
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE
The end of the Iran-Iraq War ushered in a brief period of
stability in the northern region of Iraq and southeastern
Anatolia. The Iranians stopped meddling with the Kurds, as they
had to fear Iraqi retribution. As for the Syrians, they were
severely compromised--Assad had backed a loser, which in the
Middle East is a bad thing to do. To save face, he had to
disassociate himself from the Kurdish resistance publicly.
The big winner--along with Iraq--was Turkey. Between roughly
August 1988 and the eruption of the crisis in Kuwait, Turkey's
internal situation was relatively secure. Rebel activity in the
southeast continued at a low ebb. However, as long as there was

no support forthcoming from the Iraqi Kurds, it was manageable.
In Iraq, Saddam expanded his pacification campaign. During
the war he had cleared the Iraq-Iran border of Kurds, now he
extended his cordon sanitaire to include the Turkish-Iraqi border
as well. The Iraqis built model cities to house the displaced
Kurdish villagers. The Kurds were upset at being forced from
their homes. The Ba'thists, however, felt that their action was
justified--to bring the north into his orbit, Saddam had to
control the Kurds' smuggling operations. The quarantine now in
effect did that. For years all of the states in the area had been
plagued by Kurdish smugglers. Now, the base of their operations
was shut down, a most salutary development from the standpoint of
regional governments. For the first time since the late 1950s
geographical Kurdistan was relatively peaceful. And then Iraq
invaded Kuwait.
OPERATION DESERT STORM
At the direction of the late President Turgut Ozal, Turkey
played a major role in DESERT STORM. Indeed, Ozal violated
cardinal principles laid down by Turkey's founder Kemal Ataturk
to help out the coalition.
In the mid-1920s, Ataturk enjoined the Turks to cultivate
good relations with their immediate neighbors--Iraq, Iran and
Syria. This policy was meant to offset distrust among the
neighbors caused by policies of previous Turkish governments.
However, with the development of the Kuwait crisis, Ozal changed
course, virtually offering to go to war with neighbor Iraq, at
the behest of the Bush administration. To be sure, Turkey did not
take this step, but had it not been for Turkey's support the
coalition would not have defeated Iraq as easily as it did.
For example, the interdiction of Iraq's oil pipelines
through Turkey practically ensured the success of the West's
economic embargo. The stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at
Turkey's Incirlik air base put enormous pressure on Iraq to
withstand a potential thrust from the north. Also (and this is a
factor easy to overlook) the post-conflict Kurdish rebellion
succeeded largely because Turkey had discontinued its
border-monitoring operations.
There has been speculation as to why Ozal was so forthcoming
to the United States. There really should be no mystery about
this--for Turkey it was a shrewd and effective move. Washington
needed of allies, and were Turkey to help out, there would be
rewards to come. This was undoubtedly true. Even so, Ozal
encountered stiff opposition at home to his policies. The
principles of Kemalism are meaningful to Turks. No matter how
many material benefits they might reap, Turks would not renounce
the legacy of the man who had founded their country. This
particularly was the case with the army officers.27

Turkey's Army Chief of Staff resigned shortly after Ozal
took his stand in support of the coalition.28 Indeed, due to the
opposition of the army, Ozal was kept from doing more for the
anti-Iraq forces. For example, the coalition originally
considered the idea of developing a second front against Iraq in
Turkey--this never happened.29 We do not know what role the
Turkish military played in preventing this, but we do know that
it opposed the plan. There was also a controversy over the use of
Incirlik by the coalition.30
In the face of such opposition, it is remarkable that Ozal
prevailed. Several commentators have maintained that he did so by
force of his personality.31 The author of this chapter believes
that he had more going for him than that--he had a most
compelling argument that he could use.
Since the end of World War I, Turkey has had a special
interest in Mosul, which was stripped from its control by the
League of Nations. Many Turks continue to believe that the
northern Iraqi province, originally part of the Ottoman Empire,
should once more be returned to them (See Figure 1).32
Thus, Ozal could argue that, if Turkey did not participate
actively in Operation DESERT STORM, it could not influence the
outcome of the war, which could cost it dearly. Iraq certainly
was going to lose. The question was how big, and what precisely
it would forfeit. If the Iraqi state dissolved, what would be the
fate of Mosul? The possibility existed that some sort of
independent Kurdish entity would emerge.
The idea that Mosul might become Kurdish was anathema to
Turkey's politicians (not to mention the army). Hence, Ozal could
argue that he had to back the coalition, or else Turkey could be
cheated of Mosul for the second time; and Mosul--as all Turks
were aware--included the rich oil fields of Kirkuk.33 Whether
Ozal used this argument is not known. We do know, however, that
considerable sentiment exists in Turkey against turning Mosul
over to the Kurds. Were this to occur, the author believes, the
Turkish army would intervene to prevent it. In any event, Turkey
did stand by Washington throughout DESERT STORM, and afterward
was set to receive its reward. However here Ozal's plans went
awry. With the abrupt and unexpected stampede of thousands of
Kurds into Turkey, the character of the war changed. The conflict
came home to the Turks; they now found themselves in the
international spotlight, portrayed, initially, at least, in a
none too flattering way.34
THE COSTS TO TURKEY
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT tested Ozal's pro-coalition policy
in two main areas. First, it strained Turkey's economy in ways
that it could not absorb. Initially, Ankara had to care for the
Kurdish refugees. Turks complained that they were being asked
single-handedly to rectify the plight of these people.

Further, the instrument for aiding the Kurds was the army,
which was unfortunate. The army, whose primary mission to date
had been policing Kurds (i.e., repressing them) was being asked
to dispense charity. This, the army found galling, because mixed
among the Kurdish civilians were the pesh merga, against whom it
had been warring for almost a decade.
With the world watching (via CNN), Turkey could hardly turn
its back on this problem. It did help out, but Ozal never
survived the blow to his prestige. In parliamentary elections
Ozal's party lost heavily, to the point where his government was
removed from office. To a large extent, the elections became a
referendum on the President's handling of the Kurdish issue, in
which he personally was repudiated. Ozal could maintain that he
would go on directing Turkish foreign policy.35 In fact, he got
no such opportunity, because now events really began to turn
against him. Powerful interests in the West had begun to call for
the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This, of
course, was something that no Turk--not even Ozal--could
countenance.36 As stated earlier, Turks generally were concerned
about the fate of Mosul, should Iraq be dismembered. Now, the
very outcome that Turks feared apparently was going to transpire.
As the United States came more and more to back the Kurds,
their stock soared. Barzani, (along with Jalal Talabani of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), had become the leader of the
Iraqi Kurds, and now the U.S. State Department invited him to
Washington, an unprecedented show of regard.37 However, just as
things appeared to be going well for the Kurds, the PKK returned
to the scene. As noted earlier the PKK had maintained a presence
in southeastern Turkey, even after the Iran-Iraq War ended. Now,
it took advantage of the chaos resulting from DESERT STORM to
smuggle more of its cadres into the region. Thus, while world
public opinion embraced the Kurds, the Turkish army was attacked
by the most violent wing of the Kurdish movement.38 The
appearance of the PKK was announced spectacularly with a
firebombing of an Istanbul department store. A mob shouting "long
live Kurdistan" set the seven-story building ablaze, killing 11
people.39
Turkey's response was to intensify military repression
throughout the southeast, and, when violence continued in the
region, to reinstate the policy of cross-border raiding into Iraq
(essentially it undertook to cleanse the border region). When the
world community protested this, the Turkish army turned a deaf
ear. The initial cross-border operation was followed by more.40
Ozal, his power sharply curtailed, could not deflect the
army from its course. Indeed, the officers could claim to be
defending Turkey's vital interests, because all Turks--or at
least all non-Kurdish Turks--agreed that Kurdish separatism was a
menace; anything that promoted it must be expunged.

Unexpectedly the Iraqi Kurds became involved in the crisis.
In October 1992, Barzani and Talabani held a parley with
Turkey's army commanders, in which they pleaded for an end to the
army's operations. It appeared that, in conducting the raids, the
Turkish army made no distinction between innocent Iraqi Kurds and
PKK cadres--any Kurds that it encountered were attacked.
The Turkish commanders rebuffed the Iraqi Kurds' entreaties,
until Talabani publicly denounced the PKK as "tools" of the
Iranians. His colleague Barzani echoed this sentiment, saying,
"It's no secret, Iran and Syria are aiding the Turkish rebels.
Each has his own purpose and aim but the ultimate aim they all
agree on is to undermine the Kurdish movement, and destroy what
we have here (in Iraq)."41 After that, the Turkish army, and the
Barzani and Talabani Kurds, joined forces to purge the northern
region of the PKK.42
DE JA VU ALL OVER AGAIN
Effectively, the Kurds are now back where they were in the
1970s.43 Barzani and Talabani--by agreeing to cooperate with the
Turkish army--have reinstated the policy of Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, Masoud's father, i.e., assisting Turkey to repress the
Turkish-Kurdish resistance. Further, by throwing in their lot
with the Turkish army, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have ended
whatever hope they might have had of gaining independence. They
are now hostages of the Turks.
Ankara will not allow them to form a state; the most that it
will do is sanction some sort of de facto independent status for
them.44 Thus, the Iraqi Kurds are left hanging, in a kind of
limbo, as it were--neither part of Iraq, nor independent, and
they suffer the worst of both worlds.
Baghdad has adopted the stance that, since it does not rule
the north, it will not look out for the area. Supply of
electricity and potable water, maintenance of highways--all this
has been discontinued. The Kurds must provide such services
themselves, something they cannot do. For help, the Kurds have
turned to the international relief agencies. But the agencies are
badly overworked, and are cutting back on their operations. Thus
the Kurds are not receiving nearly the help that they need.45
One would expect the United States to come to the Kurds'
aid. However, this has not happened, apparently because
Washington does not view the situation as permanent. U.S.
policymakers seem to believe that Saddam's days are numbered, and
therefore things will turn out right once he is gone. (In the
author's view this is a miscalculation.)
The Turkish army, however has reason to be pleased with the
setup--as it should be. Its situation is salutory. Whenever it
perceives that the Kurds are getting out of line, it pounces on
them, after which it returns to Turkey to take up its stance of

vigilance once again. And for this, it is well supplied with
weapons and resources.46 The army has something that all armies
crave--a well-defined, concrete mission.
The only question is, what is the effect of all this likely
to be on Turkey? Turkey has a Kurdish problem. It is not
attempting to deal with it, except through repression.47 Is it
likely that in the long term this approach will pay off? For the
answer to that we need to look at the economics of the
situation.48
ECONOMICS
The Turks, like their neighbors the Iranians and Iraqis, are
fiercely nationalistic.49 In line with this, Turkey tried in the
1960s and throughout most of the 1970s to become self-reliant by
practicing import substitution. The attempt failed, but not for
lack of commitment on the part of Turkey's rulers.
Turkish governments regularly subsidized the public sector.
By 1977, however, the policy had to be abandoned; Turkey could no
longer borrow the funds it needed to continue public funding
(international lenders, having decided that Turkey was not a good
risk, withdrew their support).
With that Turkey had but one effective option--to put itself
in the hands of the International Monetary Fund, which, in return
for painful concessions on Turkey's part, agreed to restructure
its debts. he IMF wanted Turkey to shift its focus to exports,
and, to make Turkish products competitive internationally, Ankara
was asked to pursue a policy of domestic austerity. This meant
cutting wages, eliminating unnecessary jobs, and devaluating the
currency.
As we will show, the IMF-imposed regimen was not a total
success. In the short run, however--and in specific areas--it
worked amazingly well. Turkey's balance of payments became more
stable, exports increased dramatically and inflation dropped
dramatically, as well.50
These results probably could not have been achieved,
however, had there not been a military coup. As noted above,
there had been a military takeover in Turkey in the late 1970s.
In power, the army imposed measures that Turkey's weak civilian
leaders would not attempt.51 In effect, Turkey's economic
rejuvenation was carried out under martial law.
Even at this, Turkey's economy would probably not have
turned around were it not for another factor. Turkey was able to
develop regional markets to supplement those of Europe and the
United States. This was essential because after 1985, when the
price of oil plummeted, some of its western markets dried up.
Turkey faced a similar falling off in the Middle East--however in
this area it had something else going for it.
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Iran similarly depended on Turkey for the transit of vitally
needed supplies. Machine parts, food, and basic consumer products
were trucked to Iran through Turkey. Whenever this traffic was
interdicted, Iran faced crisis.53 Thus, the period of the
Iran-Iraq War had a stimulating effect on Turkey's regional
trade. It also created a foundation on which all the regional
states could build when the Iran-Iraq War ended.
For a brief period after the war Turkey and its neighbors
undertook to cooperate economically, and then came Kuwait. With
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and President Bush's pressure on
Turkey to support the coalition, Ankara's regional market
collapsed. Its trade with Iraq was interdicted by the
U.N.-imposed embargo. Transit fees for oil and oil at bargain
prices were discontinued.54
To be sure, the coalition made up part of the shortfall.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together contributed $12 billion dollars
in aid to the frontline states, including Turkey.55 In addition,
Washington increased Turkey's textile quota.56 Germany moved a
battalion to Turkey to support DESERT STORM, and afterward left
all of the unit's equipment for Turkey's use.57
This largesse, however, did not change the reality of
Turkey's altered economic position. Just when it appeared that
Turkey's economy was about to take off, it foundered. Iran was
still a trading partner, but after the end of the Iran-Iraq War
Tehran found itself constrained in many of the same ways as Iraq.
(Attempts by Rafsanjani to turn Iran's economy around after the
disastrous defeat in the Iran-Iraq War have, so far, not proved
successful.)
Turkey thus emerged from Operation DESERT STORM in a
compromised position. It had definitely benefited in terms of
gaining the good will of the United States. Not only did
President Bush channel many direct and indirect perquisites its
way, but he also held out hope of more rewards to come. For
example, Bush strongly supported the idea of an American opening
to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in which Turkey
would become the agent of America's cultural and economic
advance. Bush also backed Turkey's bid to become a full member of
the European Economic Community, and even went so far as to
endorse Turkey's position on Cyprus.58
All these prospects of aid are now up in the air-immediately after DESERT STORM, President Bush was voted out of

office. Faced with severe economic constraints, the U.S. Congress
began looking for economies, and in the process cut Turkey's
regular allotment of foreign aid. Whereas Bush's last aid request
to ongress for Turkey was $543 million, Congress has now cut that
to $450 million and is converting it to loans.59 As for the other
schemes promoted by Bush, they may not be realized.
Turkey will presumably continue to receive aid from the IMF.
However, as noted above there is a downside to the Fund's
assistance. IMF-mandated reforms have imposed hardships on
Turkey's population. Job losses have never really been recouped.
Wages, cut to make Turkey competitive on the world market, remain
low. Inflation, after dropping dramatically, has now shot up
again to over 70 percent.60
Thus, the Turkish people have borne the brunt of the
IMF-imposed measures. Hardest hit has been the rural sector, and
this, by and large, comprises the Kurds. This is troubling
because the formerly passive Kurdish population is docile no
longer--not since the advent of the PKK.
TURKEY AND THE PKK TODAY
As suggested earlier, the PKK became the vanguard of the
Turkish-Kurdish struggle practically by default. There were no
active Kurdish opposition groups, and hence the field of
opposition was pretty much left to it. At the same time (also
noted) the PKK cadres were not really far removed from ghetto
toughs. As long as this was the perception (that is, that the PKK
cadres were thugs), Turkish authorities could hope to make
headway against them, counting on the support of peace-loving
Kurds who were offended by violence.
For awhile it seemed that the PKK would be extinguished.
Had it not been for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the author feels,
it probably would have been. The operation did two things for the
PKK. It enabled the party to expand its operations in the
southeast, after Baghdad's cleansing operations had rendered it
virtually defunct.
Along with this, the PKK benefited from international media
coverage of the Kurds. Kurds who had given up on their Kurdish
identity are now insisting upon it. Since the PKK is the group
inside Turkey that is avowedly Kurdish, more and more Kurds are
identifying with it.
Thus, Turkey's heretofore suppressed Kurdish minority has
grown assertive, and this in turn has transformed conditions in
the southern region. From being a sleepy backwater of modern
Turkish society, it has turned into a hotbed of revolt.
A BASE FOR REVOLT
Although Kurds are in the forefront of the opposition in

Turkey, it would be wrong to assume that domestic unrest is a
specifically Kurdish phenomenon. Inside Turkey today a number of
subversive groups operate. Some of the most lethal are not
Kurdish at all.61 At the same time, all profit from the poor
economic conditions with which Turkey is currently afflicted.
The rise of the PKK has transformed the political climate
by, in effect, establishing a safe haven for the disaffected
groups, and this, in turn, has enhanced their survival chances.
No longer are they restricted to operating underground in Ankara
and Istanbul; they can now hide out in the provinces, alongside
the PKK.
To be sure, Turkish security forces are present throughout
this region; but Turkish police are no different from police
anywhere--to operate efficiently they depend on information. If
the local Kurds will not cooperate, the police are handicapped.
This seems to be the present situation--otherwise why has the
army been unable to make good its threat to eliminate the
radicals?
One could argue that in the long term there is no cause for
concern. After all, the Iraqi-Turkish border is closed; the Iraqi
Kurds have teamed up with the Turkish army against the PKK. Is it
not just a matter of time before the rebellion is crushed? To be
sure, there would be grounds for optimism, were it not that Iran
has become a factor in the equation. The author will now attempt
to show that, as Talabani has charged, Iran and Syria have
resumed their intrigues against Turkey.
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?
Iran is a rival of Turkey in a number of areas. However,
neither Ankara nor Tehran wish to go to war with each other.
Moreover, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as Iran's president, has reasons of
his own for wanting to avoid a break with the Turks. His
opposition in the Tehran government comprises radicals who oppose
Turkey as an impious, anti-Islamic regime.62 Hence Rafsanjani is
drawn to support Ankara on the principle of "the enemy of my
enemy is my friend."
Nonetheless, Rafsanjani is Khomeini's heir, and it was a
basic precept of the late Ayatollah's teaching that the United
States is the number one enemy of Iran. No reason exists to
believe that Rafsanjani--or any of the men around him--have given
up on this opinion.
And this is where the difficulty comes in. Earlier we
described how Syria and Iran both came to view Turkey as a Trojan
Horse. It, in their eyes, is a vehicle whereby NATO spreads its
influence throughout the region.
The mullahs who presently rule Iran have imbibed that view.
This feeling (of mistrust for Ankara) flared anew during

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Having a NATO force next door in Iraqi
Kurdistan was not something the mullas relished. They waited
anxiously for the operation to end; after which they expected
that the Western forces would depart. When this did not happen-when instead the operation dragged out, the mullas became greatly
upset. They blasted Turkey, claiming that Ankara's accommodation
of the United States damaged Turkish-Iranian relations.63
Some Iranian commentators have pointed to the situation that
obtained with the Kurds in the 1970s, when Mulla Mustafa led the
Iraqi-Kurdish resistance movement. We have already alluded to
this in our study. At that time, northern Iraq was turned into a
base--not only for the Turkish army, but for the CIA, the Shah's
security force SAVAK, and the Israelis.
The Iranian leaders remember all this, and thus they regard
the present setup in Kurdistan with suspicion. PROVIDE COMFORT is
not perceived by them to be a humanitarian operation. It is yet
another stage in the NATO's attempt to takeover in the region.64
In addition, the Iranians' suspicions have been reinforced by
Washington's recent espousal of the so-called policy of "Dual
Containment." Under it, the Iranians would be subjected to
controls, the aim of which would be to deny them access to
certain weapons and technology they could use to modernize their
military.65 In effect, Iran's treatment by the West would not
differ greatly from what Iraq is undergoing.
For Rafsanjani, Washington's policy change confirms his
deepest suspicions, and this has put the Iranian leader on the
spot. What should he do? It appears that he has made up his mind
to revive the terror war.
IRAN'S RESPONSE
At the end of June 1993 expatriate Kurdish workers all over
Europe erupted in a rampage of attacks on Turkish embassies and
missions. Twenty-nine cities were involved and thousands of
demonstrators took part. Nothing like this has been seen since
the 1960s.66
Western intelligence and the media, in speculating about the
rampages, blamed the PKK. No one, however, questioned whether the
group had received outside aid, which ought to have been a
consideration.
It is not possible that the PKK could have performed an
operation like this on its own; it was far too ambitious an
undertaking. There would have had to have been an infrastructure
on which the protestors could have relied, and the PKK does not
have such a network. Moreover, the operation would have required
considerable funding (there aren't that many committed PKK
members in Europe).
There are really only three states that could have

masterminded the embassy attacks. Iraq obviously comes to mind.
However, Iraq dismantled its terrorist apparatus in 1983, and
there is no evidence that it subsequently geared back up
(rebuilding a network of this sort is no easy thing to do).
Further, it is unlikely that Iraq would have links to the PKK, an
organization based in Damascus, the capital of its arch rival.
Syria is the next likely candidate. Turkey has consistently
accused Assad of supporting the PKK, and has been pressing him to
close down PKK offices in Damascus.67 The Syrians have refused to
do this. However, at the same time, Assad has kept a low profile
lately. He does not wish to be perceived as a sponsor of
terrorism, while the peace talks with Israel are in process. It
is the author's belief that Assad is following essentially the
same strategy with the PKK he pursued earlier--he is keeping open
his lines to the group, while being careful not to be seen to be
openly backing it.
That leaves Tehran as the real culprit. Here the evidence
would appear to be compelling. Iran has the infrastructure in
place throughout Europe to assist in attacks of this nature.68
Further, it has recently been targeting Ankara on another front.
In July of this year, members of the pro-Iranian Hizbollah
burned down a hotel in Ankara at which a professed supporter of
author Salman Rushdie was staying.69 The Turkish media publicly
branded Tehran as the instigator of this attack. In addition,
several prominent Turkish journalists (outspoken secularists)
have been assassinated by groups the Turkish media has tied to
Tehran.70
Finally we know that Iran has a history of perpetrating this
type of action. As we have just detailed, it did this throughout
the 1980s. All of the tactics that Iran employed then are being
used now--attacks against Turkish embassies and diplomats, the
staging of cross-border raids into Turkey from Iranian bases.
Even the assets that are being employed are identical--the PKK,
ASALA, and Hizbollah. In crude terms, Tehran has the modus
operandi for a job like this, and this--when it comes to dealing
with terrorists--is crucial.
The final clinching factor, however, is the timing of the
embassy attacks--they came on June 24, one day before the Turkish
parliament by a voice vote agreed to extend permission of the
United States to use Incirlik for overflights of Iraq in
connection with PROVIDE COMFORT. In the meantime, the Turkish
government has formally accused Iran of supporting the
terrorists; it claims to have conclusive evidence to prove
this.71
WHAT TO DO?
At the heart of this problem, in the author's view, is the
Turkish army-Barzani-Talabani deal, and Washington's response to
it. By seeming to have accepted the deal, U.S. policymakers have

fostered the belief that the Kurds are an instrument of U.S.
policy.
To an American this may seem farfetched, but one must try to
view the matter through the eyes of a Middle Easterner. The
situation in Kurdistan today too much resembles the setup in the
1970s, when Mulla Mustafa made his deal with the Shah of Iran,
the CIA and Israel. Then, the north of Iraq was perceived by many
as a base of imperialism and Zionism--and that is the way it is
being seen (at least in Iran) today.
To counter this impression Washington might want to rethink
its policy toward the Kurds. It needs to show that it is
primarily interested in their welfare and is not merely wielding
them as a weapon against Saddam Hussein. In the author's view
there is a way of doing this.
Earlier this year the Iraqi Kurds declared their support for
a federated Iraq.72 This would be a state combining a Kurdish
area in the north with another in the south comprising the Arabs-two regions under the rule of Baghdad.
Washington should push the Kurds to start negotiations with
Baghdad on this proposal. The Ba'thists would like to end the
economic embargo, and would probably go along with a federation-provided that they retained key portfolios in the government,
with the Kurds left to manage their local affairs.
The deal would have to be made with Saddam since no other
Iraqi leader could make it stick, and this would mean that
Washington would have to abandon its aim of deposing the Iraqi
President. But, in the author's view, it is not Washington's job
to depose foreign heads of state. This is something for the
Iraqi people to do.
The process of setting up the federation would take time,
but, as long as there was movement, events should be allowed to
work themselves out. The important thing is that matters not be
permitted to drift, as they are doing now. It is this drift that
is exciting suspicions among the regional actors that the United
States is striving for hegemonic control. (The idea being that as
long as the situation is not resolved, the United States is
enabled to keep a military presence in the area.)
What about the regional actors--how would they react to this
proposal? If Tehran and Damascus truly are worried about the
extension of NATO power into the region, then federation should
be reassuring to them. Under the arrangement, the Kurds would not
require a NATO shield, and the allied forces could speedily
depart.
Also, as part of the deal the border to Turkey would be
closed, thus shutting off the PKK. This would benefit all the
states that have large Kurdish populations because none is

anxious to see the emergence of a separate Kurdish nation. The
Turkish Kurds would suffer, to be sure, but then, the United
States has influence with Ankara, which it can use to protect the
Turkish Kurds.
Moreover, under a federated setup, northern Iraq would be a
much more orderly place. Whatever else, the Iraqi Ba'th Party is
disposed to maintain order. It would never tolerate smuggling,
and all of the other lawless pursuits that currently are going on
in the area.73
TURKEY AND THE FUTURE
Many have argued that Turkey is on the threshold of a golden
era, and indeed it does appear that opportunities are available
to it in a number of areas. For example, Turkey could be enriched
by selling water from the newly built Ataturk Dam. Numerous
Middle Eastern states, including Israel and Kuwait, would leap at
the opportunity to tap into this resource.74 There is also talk
of establishing a region-wide electric grid.75
None of this, however, is going to happen if the area is
torn apart with strife, and this brings us to consider the
alternative to the solution that we are proposing. Barring some
constructive move, we are certain to see more anti-Turkish
activity in the days ahead, both in Europe and the Kurdish areas
of Turkey and Iraq. This means that Ankara is going to have to
devote more and more of its limited economic resources to
quelling disturbances in the Kurdish community.
Further, military action against the Kurds is bound to have
an adverse influence on Turkey's relations with countries in
Europe and with the United States. Already there have been calls
both here and abroad for Turkey to correct what are viewed as
human rights abuses.76
Turkey does not need this sort of grief. It would be far
better, if it could put the Kurdish problem behind it, and devote
itself to building up its economy. Moreover, this might also
improve its chances of gaining entry to the European Economic
Community. As was pointed out in the last chapter, much of the
Europeans' concern about granting Turkey membership derives from
their unhappiness at having so many expatriate Turks living in
their midst. If Turkey's economy improves, many of these Turks
would leave Europe to take jobs at home.
THE EFFECTS ON AMERICA
There is a postscript to this whole affair; That is, it
obviously also affects the United States. Sooner or later, in the
author's view, the PKK is going to start targeting American
interests. The group is extremely radical, and, in its public
statements, has frequently denounced the United States.

Moreover, U.S. forces at Incirlik are exposed to attack by
the PKK. The American public is obviously unhappy about military
operations in areas where the vital interests of the United
States are not at risk.
In the author's view, America does not need a military
presence in northern Iraq.77 It does not add to our security
position in the Middle East. Also, when one considers the terrain
that American troops would have to fight in (were this to be
necessary), the situation becomes nightmarish.
At the same time, any disengagement from Kurdistan is sure
to outrage the Kurds' numerous supporters in the United States
and Europe. Given this fact, the Clinton administration may not
see its way clear to act. This is understandable.
However, the Administration should then begin to calculate
the costs of going on with things as they are--both in terms of
money and lives. The U.S. military should inform the President
what would be required to maintain our current presence in the
area--under the worst case scenario, where U.S. troops were
actually coming under assault.
Finally, American policymakers should begin consultations
with the Turks about how they view events. We need to be certain
of where they stand in this. If the author is correct, they are
being drawn into a situation that is fraught with danger. At the
least they face a prolonged bout of instability. At worst there
is the prospect of civil war looming ahead.
There are indications that the Turkish government would like
to disassociate itself from PROVIDE COMFORT, and then it would be
prepared to strive for some equable solution to the Kurdish
problem.78 U.S. policymakers should proceed on the basis that
this is the case, and then try to work with Ankara on this
matter.
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CHAPTER 4
TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
IN THE FORMER USSR AND U.S. INTERESTS
Dr. Stephen J. Blank
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the USSR has transformed Turkey's
geostrategic engagement with the post-Soviet successor states,
and presents Turkey with both unprecedented opportunities and
risks. Turkey engages all the post-Soviet successor states in
relationships of trade and arms transfers, conducts economic and
defense discussions with Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, and
is Russia's rival for influence in the Black Sea, Central Asia,
and Transcaucasia. Turkey's Transcaucasian and Central Asian
policies have also fostered a regional rivalry with Iran. This
complex network of Turkish policies and regional relations also
has potential repercussions for U.S. interests.
The most serious of these exist in Transcaucasia. The war
over Nagorno-Karabakh could embroil Turkey with Armenia and
Russia in a war it cannot win. This war and its consequences have
also displayed Turkey's inability to aid Azerbaijan. If Turkey
cannot stop Azerbaijan from reverting to a Russian sphere, that
calls into question Turkey's prospects throughout the former
USSR. In that case Central Asia and Transcaucasia's future would
once again be an open question, signifying the unsettled quality
of the local state systems.1
Menaced in modern times by the spread of Russian/Soviet
power, Turkey has used either of two strategies. One strategy
relied upon forging coalitions with other European or Western
powers--the United States--to resist Russian ambitions and defend
Turkey. NATO exemplifies that strategy. The second strategy
accepted a wide spectrum of cooperative ties with Russia running
from partnership through friendship all the way to temporary
Russian tutelage.
Currently facing a democratic but unstable Russia that shows
continuing interest in its former imperial peripheries, Turkey
has borrowed a leaf from both strategies. Turkey seeks to
preserve its friendship and large economic ties with Russia. At
the same time it pursues a robust, but controlled policy to
spread Turkish influence in Transcaucasia, the Black Sea, and
Central Asia to form a zone of influence and keep Russia away
from Turkey's borders.
TURKEY'S REGIONAL POLICY GOALS
Apart from the open war between Armenians and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a hidden regional conflict
between Turkey's drive to build a zone of influence in

Transcaucasia and Russia's determination not to be excluded from
its traditional spheres of influence. Turkey's strategy to
achieve influence reflected its calculus of Ankara's regional
interests and of U.S. support for Turkish policy. The Bush
administration, and apparently now the Clinton administration as
well, openly encouraged Turkey to proclaim itself a Westernizing
model for the former Soviet republics to block Iran's (and
perhaps covertly Russia's) influence in Transcaucasia and Central
Asia.2
But because Turkey also acts in the Balkans and the Middle
East and faces a long-standing Kurdish insurgency at home, it
cannot refrain from strategic engagement in those areas to
concentrate exclusively in Transcaucasia. Turkey's position at
the junction of these regions prevents undue concentration on any
one area lest it lose influence in the others. Turkey must claim
a presence in all four areas. As the late President Ozal said,
Whatever the shape of things to come, we will be the
real elements and most important pieces of the status
quo and new order to be established in the region from
the Balkans to Central Asia. In this region, there
cannot be a status quo or political order that will
exclude us.3
Although Ozal's vision was probably far more expansive than
all the states in these regions would like, many of them need to
have a Turkish presence in order to block other contenders for
regional preeminence, e.g. Russia. Yevhen Marchuk, the head of
Ukraine's Security Service, listed Turkish participation in
assuring Ukraine's security as a high priority for Kiev. Turkey's
experiment in capitalism and democracy, and its military
prominence in the Black Sea as Russo-Ukrainian forces have
diminished make it an important factor in Ukraine's security and
a model for Ukraine. Creating a multilateral security system in
the Black Sea and Mediterranean to protect Ukraine and Turkey
from economic or military threats and their mutual military
cooperation thus became part of both states' agendas.4
Domestic economic factors also affect Turkey's policies and
ability to play the role of a model. In July 1993, Turkey had a
73 percent annual inflation rate and its state budget is
operating at the limits of its capacity. Its capital resources
are also heavily engaged in the mammoth Ataturk Dam and
hydroelectric project and a substantial military modernization
program. In addition, 30 percent of its expanding military budget
goes to contain the Kurds who appear to be a growing burden.5
Finally, Turkey's annual per capita income is only $2000, a
figure that needs to grow if Turkey is to overcome internal and
international economic challenges.
Another factor affecting Turkey's strategy is Turkish
defense policy. Turkey is undergoing large-scale long-term
defense modernization. The military's high status in policy

making and society, the impact of DESERT STORM, and the violence
in Kurdistan and the Transcaucasus are invoked to justify this
program.6 The program aims to build modern forces needed to
ensure Turkish security and gain self-sufficiency in production.7
Turkish officials also say they need to develop a capability to
produce and sell arms to Central Asian states, thus linking
economic and military factors to foreign policy.8 Turkey also is
restructuring its forces to make missile defense a high priority
against proliferation threats from its neighbors. The program
evidently will cost $12 billion, a 20 percent increase over
original estimates.9 Turkey's inflation rate, military
modernization, and the socio-economic costs of the Kurdish
insurgency all suggest a broad unfinished domestic agenda that
constrains Turkey fiscally and economically from playing a
leading or dominating role in the ex-Soviet republics. Those
constraints also suggest the high importance of economic goals in
Turkey's overall foreign strategic engagement including the CIS.
Equally important is the fact that Chief of Staff, General Mattei
Dogan Gures, frankly stated that the Kurdish threat to Turkey's
territorial integrity is the military's first priority.10 This
line of policy all but rules out serious consideration of
military action on behalf of Azerbaijan in its current crisis.
Gures' dictum not only reflects an inward looking military policy
that rejects foreign activity, it also reflects the limits that
Turkey's economy and military modernization program place on
Turkey's war-fighting capabilities.
That consideration takes us to the heart of Turkey's
strategic dilemma. Turkey wants to and feels called upon by
others, e.g. Ukraine, to extend its influence, in President
Demirel's words, "From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China."
Yet domestic economic factors mean Turkey cannot afford to play
this primarily economic role. Nor can Ankara escape the fact that
efforts to play this role will inevitably increase tensions with
Russia and Iran and could lead to military challenges that it
cannot or will not accept, e.g. intervention on behalf of
Azerbaijan. As Demirel recently observed, Turkey does not govern
Azerbaijan and thus cannot intervene in a sovereign state's
domestic affairs.11
Indeed, to reach a level where it can play this prominent
economic role abroad based on a flourishing domestic economy,
Turkey's key goal throughout the former USSR apparently is access
to economic markets, particularly in energy. To protect its
energy sources from interruptions by Iran, Iraq, or Russia,
Turkey seeks a continuous pipeline linking it, through Azerbaijan
and the Caspian Sea, with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. A prime
strategic objective is a leading position in the transport, if
not exploration, extraction, and refining, of Azeri and Central
Asian oil and gas to the West. Attaining these objectives would
make Turkey the middleman in an extremely lucrative East-West
energy business and offer it an enormous windfall.12 Those are
Turkey's real stakes in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

This war, fought by local Armenians for freedom from Azeri
and Soviet oppression so that they can unite with Armenia could
dismember Azerbaijan, and bring all the outside powers: Turkey,
Iran, and Russia into the conflict. Turkey has backed the former
Azeri government of Abulfaz Elchibey, an outspoken Pan-Turk, and
provided it with much assistance. The payoff to Ankara was to be
a postwar Azerbaijan that showcased the Turkish model and
provided Turkey with this uninterrupted supply of Central Asian
and Azeri gas and oil. In 1992 Foreign Minister Cetin proposed a
territorial realignment as part of a peace settlement that would
attain those very goals.
Cetin proposed, with U.S. support, that should a cease-fire
occur and negotiations begin, the postwar settlement should
create a pure Armenian state out of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
and a continuous, purely Muslim, Turkic, state of Azerbaijan
incorporating the formerly detached area of Nakhichevan.(See
Figure 2.) This territorial exchange would allow construction of
a pipeline whose path conformed to Turkey's objectives.13

Under this plan, Azerbaijan would remain intact but it and
Armenia would be dependent on Turkey while Turkey obtained its
cherished pipeline. The plan cuts off Iran and Russia from those
energy routes and Russia from Transcaucasia as Central Asian oil
and gas go directly to Turkey and Europe, making Turkey a major
player in the energy game.14 This plan also would effectively
reorient much of Central Asia's economy from Russia to Turkey and

the West since energy is that region's main source of foreign
exchange. Turkey could then lead Central Asia and Transcaucasia
into overall economic integration and even alliance.15
But Turkey's support for that solution and its potential
future ramifications, in turn, have led Iran and Russia to
counter Turkish efforts for leverage over the region's energy
sources and its overall economy. At present, for example, Iran
has blocked Turkey's TIR (Transit Highway International) trucks
from its highways, effectively obstructing overland trade with
Azerbaijan and Central Asia. This has forced Turkey to retaliate
in kind for what it believes are politically dictated actions.16
Such actions indicate the value that rival regional actors place
upon economic relationships in the former Soviet republics.
On Turkey's part, President Demirel told a recent gathering
of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) of Muslim states,
which now includes the ex-Soviet republics, that Turkey strongly
believes in those ex-republics' immense development potential.
The condition for that development is that they follow Turkey's
example by freeing the private sector and coalescing in a common
trading bloc.17 His speech showed that he sees Turkey's role as
analogous to Germany's in the EC. He also stressed the centrality
of energy cooperation as a precondition for unity.
Utilization of the rich energy potential of
manner whereby the needs of all the countries of
satisfied and extension to international markets
is an issue of special importance which leads to
establishment of lasting ties.18
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Demirel's remarks show the close linkage between Turkey's
energy objectives and Turkey and the ECO's ability to weld the
new republics into an economic `common market.' Turkey's
economic limitations already cast doubt upon this endeavor's
success; but its failure in Azerbaijan throws Turkey's entire
strategic profile as a model and leader into question.
TURKISH SECURITY AND THE WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
The Nagorno-Karabakh war starkly illustrates how vulnerable
Turkey's grand design is to continued local warfare. This war
also has unappealing implications for Turkey's overall security
interests. Those vital interests include a friendly and stable
Azerbaijan, Armenia's recognition that it depends on Turkey, and
ultimately a regional regime that precludes direct Russian
military pressure on Turkey.19
More importantly, the continuing Nagorno-Karabakh war may
prevent Turkey from realizing its ambitions, bring back the
Russians, possibly introduce Iran into the region, and intensify
the risks of a much wider and more dangerous war. This is
particularly true since the Armenian forces exploited the coup
against Elchibey to break a cease-fire based on U.N. Resolution

882 and seize more Azeri territory during July-August 1993. If
the extreme nationalist Dashnak Party members (who appear to
control the Nagorno-Karabakh army) have their way, they will
apparently use their victories to engineer the secession of the
Lach and/or Lezgin peoples from Azerbaijan. This action would
effectively dismember Azerbaijan, forcing Turkey to act,20 as
well as Iran. Already Iran has strongly protested Armenian
forces' advance all the way to the its border.21 If Turkey
intervenes, it could then also face the Russian division
stationed on the border under the Tashkent Treaty on collective
security of the CIS that Armenia and Russia signed. Russian
analysts state that because that force has no air defense,
Russia can only support it by threats of nuclear retaliation, a
factor that has deterred Turkey.22
Because Turkey is deterred from active intervention in the
Nagorno-Karabakh war, it cannot unilaterally reshape the future
Transcaucasia's regional order and terminate Russian military
pressure on its border. Turkish analysts note that the military
cannot be expected to act as Azerbaijan's "subcontractor" for
security. And, with good reason, they place little credence in a
U.N. peacekeeping mission. Nor does Turkey wish to support the
new Aliev regime in Baku until and unless a referendum is held by
Azeris on their government. All these factors combine to deter
Turkey from intervention despite its threats to the Armenian
forces.23 Still, Turkey's condition of being deterred does not
mean Turkey cannot reach any of its goals. Rather Turkey must
accept a large degree of Russian participation and perhaps even
predominance in any regional settlement. So Turkey has had to
accept a trilateral political solution and probably a secondary
role. Turkey, Russia, and the United States recently coauthored
U.N. Resolution 882 authorizing a cease-fire in Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh, a sign that the other coauthors recognize that
Turkey has regional interests.
But continued war in Nagorno-Karabakh threatens even that
more modest objective. And, the chaos in Azerbaijan compounds
that threat because it has led to the breakdown of the cease-fire
accords and renewed fighting. Indeed, Turkey's alarm at new
trends is palpable. On July 26, 1993, it proposed that U.N.
peacemakers, including Turkish forces, be sent to Azerbaijan.24
This would not be seen in Erevan or Moscow as peacekeeping, but
as Turkey's intervention in the region to save Baku and Elchibey.
This proposal would almost certainly be unacceptable to Erevan,
the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Iran, and to Russia, which is
determined to monopolize peacekeeping operations in the former
USSR. Turkish papers also talk of attacking the new government in
Baku before the CSCE for violating human rights and even suggest
sanctions.25 However, it is unlikely that either proposal will be
adopted. Those proposals signify Turkey's failed policies, not
strength, and reflect Ankara's inability to save its client and
sustain a pro-Turkish regime in Baku. The government there, led
by Geidar Aliyev and the rebel commander, now Defense Minister,
Guseinov, intend to restore Azerbaijan's integrity and reverse

Elchibey's insufficient attention to Russia.26
Thus, this war exposes the weakness of Turkish strategy and
policy. Although Turkey became progressively more ready in 1993
to display coercive diplomacy by military forces to make its
point it still could not or would not do anything for Elchibey.27
It was in keeping with Turkish policy to speak more resolutely
than it acts. But the failure of coercive diplomacy to seriously
deter the Armenians could, in time, further stimulate an already
aroused Turkish public opinion unhappy with Azeri defeats to
demand real pressure on Armenia in support of Azerbaijan which is
racially, culturally, and politically very close to Turkey.
Turkey's ability to stay out of this war, its clear desire, is,
therefore, potentially limited by the fact that public agitation
for a tough line has become the daily stuff of domestic
politics.28 Should public opinion grasp the full measure of
Turkey's failure it may well turn against the government and
demand tougher policies at home or abroad. Whatever the outcome,
Turkey must now reappraise its strategy and policy. Furthermore,
if Armenian forces stay at the Iranian-Azeri border and do indeed
bifurcate Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey will have to join
hands to compel an Armenian retreat and a territorial solution.
In September 1993, Armenian advances to the Azeri border with
Iran compelled Iran to mass troops on its side of the border and
led Turkey to take its own precautionary military actions on its
border with Armenia. Both of these military measures remain in
effect at the time of this writing. Joint intervention would
restore Russia's position in the Transcaucasus, offer Iran a
legitimate role there as well as respectability by virtue of its
moderation and association with Moscow and Ankara, and leave
Turkey with marginal gains at best.
Thus today Turkey loses either way. If the cease-fire
negotiated under the terms of U.N. Resolution 882 before the coup
against Elchibey is restored and negotiations begin, Russian, not
Turkish, influence will predominate in Baku and Erevan because
Russia is Erevan's protector against Turkey and the new regime in
Baku looks towards Moscow, not Ankara, as a regional patron. On
the other hand, continued war and breakdown of the cease-fire
could also threaten Turkish interests for several reasons.
First, continued fighting makes it almost impossible for
Turkey to realize its vital economic and energy goals and
investments in Azerbaijan. Baku now spends 2/3 of its national
income on the war. It cannot invest at home and thereby attract
foreign investments, nor can it assist Turkey's energy or
investment policies. Baku has already suspended previous pipeline
negotiations and inclines towards Russian participation, a
serious blow to Turkey's interests.29
Second, as of the cease-fire Armenian forces had opened up
two direct corridors to Nagorno-Karabakh, one through Kelbadzhar
and the other to the south through territory inhabited by Lach
and Lezgin peoples. Continued fighting could stimulate

Dashnak-influenced Armenian commanders to dismember Azerbaijan
and give these peoples autonomous or even independent status.
That would break up Azerbaijan and sever its connections to the
Azeri-inhabited province of Nakhichevan, giving Armenia a much
greater land border with Iran. Or it could lead to Iran's
intervention in the war and the peace process.30 Both
alternatives are a disaster for Ankara. Azerbaijan's amputation
could also trigger Kurdish pressure to create a state partly out
of Turkey or irredentist pressure by Armenian radicals for
territorial compensation for the massacres of 1915-22.31 And
dismemberment of Azerbaijan is an outcome that Turkey's highest
officials have stated they would not tolerate.32
Third, Armenia historically has depended on its Russian
connection to block Turkey and prevent an Azeri-Russian
rapprochement. If Armenia prevails and Erevan or Baku turns to
Russia for help, Turkey could fail to achieve its regional
policy's main goals, cooperation with Baku and Armenian
subservience, while Russian influence would return to Turkey's
borders. That outcome accords with Russia's policy. Russia
announced in 1992-93 that its troops in the North Caucasus and
Moldova will remain until a political solution amenable to Russia
is worked out and that a Transcaucasus Military District will be
formed to control strategically important axes there.33 As
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray said,
Russia has an interest in preserving the integrity of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and in maintaining
their political independence and sovereignty. For their
part, these states should understand that their
political independence, integrity, and development
depend on the fact of whether they have normal
relations with Russia. The disruption of the balance
between various forces and interests leads to
redistribution of power, property, and spheres of
influence, and all this results in armed conflicts.34
Fourth, Turkey views a possible Dashnak government as a
threat since that party carries a bitter tradition of
anti-Turkish struggle for the genocide of 1915-22, itself the
fruit of years of violent struggles. The Dashnak party in Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh demands Turkish territorial compensations,
is a breeding ground for anti-Turkish Armenian terrorism, and
appears to be linking up with the Kurdish PKK.35 An Armenia freed
from dependence on Turkey or that is unstable and even conducts
various forms of low-level conflicts against Turkey or its
interests greatly adds to Turkish security problems. For example,
the PKK has targeted the pipelines from Azerbaijan and talks
openly of support from and links to Armenia.36 If such an
alliance does come to pass, it would join together two of
Turkey's security dilemmas and greatly complicate Turkish policy.
Fifth, a continued war might draw Turkey in, which would be
against its best interests. Turkish leaders believe any
intervention against Armenia would be interpreted abroad as a

Muslim-Christian war, divert U.S. and European support from
Turkey to Armenia, enhance Iran's position as a supporter of
Armenia, and seriously complicate ties with Europe, Moscow,
Tehran, and Washington.37 Such intervention also belies Demirel's
basic goals of a peaceful circle around Turkey. Thus any war
against the Dashnaks for Azerbaijan could rupture Turkish
alliances and threatens incalculable and probably protracted
outcomes.38
Although Presidents Ozal and Demirel warned Armenia in
increasingly strident terms about the integrity of Azerbaijan and
Turkey's limited patience during its offensives in early 1993,
the offensives have continued. Thus, in April-May 1993, despite
strong signs of the military's reluctance to enter the war,
Turkey heightened its forces' readiness on the border, and
intensified aerial reconnaissance in an unmistakable signal and
act of coercive diplomacy to Armenia and Armenian forces.39 Yet,
the Azeri army kept losing, a coup unseated Elchibey, Armenian
offensives continue unabated, and Turkey had to climb down from
the escalation ladder. All this indicates that Turkey cannot
deploy military power for Azerbaijan or elsewhere in the CIS. And
this failure to deploy usable force to serve policy is even more
marked because the April alert on the border was apparently the
second time that Turkey resorted to high-level military threats
and signals against Armenia, the first being in May 1992.40
Sixth, Turkish intervention also would undo the domestic
military modernization program and reverse the military
priorities laid down by General Gures. Precisely because
intervention raises those prospects, a protracted war in
Transcaucasia would set back progress on other key sectors of
Turkey's overall security policy.
The seventh reason why intervention is against Turkey's
interests is because its armed forces may not be suited to such a
low-intensity conflict type of war. Turkey's General Staff warily
viewed participation in Operation DESERT STORM. Its attitude
stemmed from fidelity to Ataturk's strictures against foreign
adventurism, fears of compromising Turkish sovereignty by acting
in a coalition, and concerns about Iraqi retaliation. However,
above and beyond those political concerns,
The military leadership apparently had serious doubts
about Turkey's ability to deploy and sustain forces
beyond their own territory, or even to conduct
large-scale mobile operations on the border with Iraq.
In short, close observation of the campaign in the Gulf
confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed
forces to wage modern conventional warfare. It has even
cast doubt on the value of the relatively modern
equipment to be acquired from the allies as a result of
the CFE agreement.41
An open-ended low intensity conflict or worse in Transcaucasia

would certainly be beyond an army of this caliber.
Finally, prolongation of the war also carries the threat of
Iranian political, and perhaps subsequent military, intervention.
Iran, too, cannot allow Armenian forces to dismember Azerbaijan.
Iran's intervention could inflame the Islamic issue at home or
abroad against Turkey and link up with the Kurds.42 For those
reasons Anakara can only be part of the trilateral initiative
that at least accepted that Turkey has regional interests. But
that is a poor surrogate for the grand design born when the USSR
collapsed.
TURKISH POLICY IMPASSE: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Turkey's policy impasse highlights the fact that its
strategic economic, political, and military ways and means do not
suffice to realize its 1991-93 objective of a zone of Turkish
influence. In Nagorno-Karabakh all of those policy instruments
proved to be unavailing. Since Demirel's accession to the
presidency in May 1993 the future direction of policy is unclear.
The new government of Tansu Ciller may well concentrate on
domestic economic issues. In that case, Ciller would necessarily
have to redefine Turkey's strategic objectives abroad and could
narrow them considerably. The outcome of any strategic review
also depends on regional conditions in the former Soviet
republics and in the other areas of Turkish engagement which may
be beyond Turkish control. For now, Turkey must also redouble its
efforts to avert direct military participation in
Nagorno-Karabakh and rethink its local objectives because its
former strategic goals there clearly can no longer be sustained.
This conclusion also applies to the fact that Turkey's
overall strategic engagement abroad reflects the internal and
external political dimension of Turkey's self-identification,
i.e., its sense of mission and how others see it. Traditionally
Turkish elites identified with Europe and sought integration with
it. However the Soviet collapse has affected Western perceptions
of Turkey's importance for Europe. Its application to the EU has
been deflected. Absent a Soviet threat, Turkey's importance to
the Pentagon, in Europe, and NATO has declined. There is a trend
to see Turkey almost exclusively in its Asiatic and Middle
Eastern context.43 Should Europe rebuff it, Turkey may look
eastward for areas to enlarge its influence and obtain a new
post-Ataturk and anti-Western mission and identity.44 That new
identity and mission could weaken Turkish involvement in Europe
or lead it into very complex regional crises in the Muslim world.
Indeed, Turkish officials argue that if Turkey cannot fully
enter the EU and WEU any time soon, its value to Central Asia as
a Western state greatly declines. Then Turkey will find it
difficult to play a stabilizing role in an area supposedly
menaced by resurgent Islamic fundamentalism. Former Acting Prime
Minister Erdal Inonu told EC leaders that if Turkey is to use its
`immense influence' on those regions to move them to democracy

and markets, it must be a full member of the EC, an unlikely
prospect, but one showing Turkey's true priorities.45 But should
Turkey be rejected by Europe and then turn east it could likely
be bogged down in Central Asia or Transcaucasia, and be unable to
influence Europe, the Black Sea, and the Balkans.
While Turkey's interest in Central Asia probably does not
mean a revived Ottomanism or Pan-Turkism, interest in the Turkic
peoples of the former USSR and the recovery of communications and
cultural-economic ties with them is clearly growing.46 Turkey,
with strong U.S. backing, has presented itself as a model of an
economically well-developed, technically advanced, secular state
that respects but limits Islam in politics, and has a stable
democratic political system. Yet this approach has until now also
implied Turkey's leadership, an approach that severely
overestimates Turkish power and could lead to serious crises.47
Closer bilateral ties and parallel interests with the United
States in the ex-Soviet areas seemed, in 1991-92, to offer Turkey
an alternative rationale for its strategic importance and a
renewed sense of mission. The turn towards the former Soviet
republics confirmed Turkey's strategic importance and even its
leadership role to itself and Washington and allowed it to escape
the deeper implications of the Kurdish problem, i.e., the need to
revise Ataturk's heritage of an exclusively Turkish state for
solving today's geopolitical problems. Dugyu Sezer argues,
In a very important sense, the scope of the Kurdish
confrontation with the Turkish state attests to the
failure of Turkish nationalism and the ethos of
modernization to create a unitary state and a
participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and
cultural identity might have flourished without
challenging the state.48
While Gures and Ciller reject anything that smacks of
separatism and an end to the unitary state, successful export of
Turkey's model to Central Asia seemed to demonstrate the
continuing validity of Turkey's model to Turks.49 Turkey could
then have its Ataturkian cake and eat it, too, preserving the
domestic structure of Ataturk's model, while venturing upon a
much bolder foreign policy.
Unfortunately, the outcome in Transcaucasia and the dawning
rivalry with Russia in the Black Sea and with other states, as
well in Central Asia, has failed to accord with the dream. This
observation, in turn, leads to a profoundly important point that
belies the comfortable assumptions involved in looking abroad to
escape domestic pressures. U.S. support for Turkey will depend
much more on a democratic Turkish resolution of its human rights,
i.e., Kurdish problem, a problem that can only be solved by
massive domestic economic growth, as Prime Minister Ciller quite
visibly knows.50 Ciller apparently will face a tough intramural
struggle with the army that wants to continue the tough policy

towards the Kurds that focuses on military repression of Kurdish
terrorism and downplays a more integrative and balanced economic
and political approach.51 Continuing harsh repression will make
it harder for the United States to claim that human rights are
obeyed. Any Turkish policy along those lines thereby risks U.S.
economic and political support. Since U.S. support for Turkey as
a model was and is crucial to the success of Turkey's entry into
Europe and penetration of Central Asia, a harsh anti-Kurd policy
would limit U.S. support and could limit Turkish activism abroad.
Secretary of State Christopher's recent talks with Turkey
indicated a mutual desire to expand U.S.-Turkish relationships
even though aid has recently been cut. But Secretary Christopher
also explicitly linked aid and support to human rights.52 While
economic factors may play a larger role than before, Turkey
clearly wants increased economic and technological assistance as
defense aid falls. Indeed, despite the severe budget cuts in
overall U.S. foreign aid and to Turkey in particular, Turkey
continues to demand guarantees on the amount of future military
aid.53 However, since progress on human rights is a major
condition for upgrading the relationship, Turkey must make
progress on the Kurds, i.e., demilitarize its policy, to continue
being a Western `interlocutor' and model for Central Asia. If
Turkey cannot resolve the Kurdish issue to U.S. satisfaction,
U.S. economic constraints will make aid to Turkey much harder to
justify. Then Turkey's strategic posture, that the United States
openly supported, will be still more exposed.
At the same time, U.S. negotiators have apparently told
Turkey that if it continues to seek guarantees to reverse the
last few years' downward trend in aid, "the United States will be
forced to close down its bases in Turkey."54 Although this may be
a bluff, some Turkish officials believe that the recent
U.S.-Bulgarian rapprochement signifies a long-term process to
relocate those bases.55
The conditionality of U.S. aid and support for Turkey's
effort to lead a grouping of Central Asian states also points up
the precariousness of Turkey's domestic structures. Flight from
unresolved domestic and economic issues posed by the Kurds to
expansive foreign policies is not a satisfactory resolution of
domestic issues. Sezer's 1981 admonition remains valid.
Unfortunately, despite the absence of obvious military
threats, the very precariousness of Turkey's domestic situation
exposes her to precisely the kind of internal and external
pressures which may dangerously undermine her ability to stand on
her own feet and formulate a coherent security policy. This
internal instability is currently the major source of Turkey's
insecurity.56
In other words, unless Turkey makes progress on its Kurdish
problem it cannot play the major role in the Turkic world that it
dreams of. By the same token if it cannot adjust outcomes in

Azerbaijan, it cannot do so anywhere else.57 Thus to achieve its
foreign policy objectives, Turkey must first settle its domestic
agenda. But these linkages of Turkey's domestic and foreign
policy also apply to its relationship with the United States.
Even as U.S. policy has promoted an expansive Turkish thrust
abroad, Washington is now retrenching and neither can nor will
support Turkish objectives in the future as in the past, thereby
exposing Turkey to more risks that Ankara can argue it took at
U.S. behest. That is not a satisfactory basis for the future of
the bilateral relationship.
TURKEY AND RUSSIA IN EUROPE, THE BLACK SEA, AND TRANSCAUCASIA
Wherever Turkey's policy engages the post-Soviet republics,
it also meets an increasingly clear Russian resistance. This
resistance takes the form of Russia's overt and covert efforts to
obtain military bases in the Transcaucasus; to become the sole
mediator in the Abkhaz-Georgian and Nagorno-Karabakh wars; to
unhinge the Elchibey government in Azerbaijan in mid-1993; to
compel all three Transcaucasian states to join the CIS and allow
for the stationing of Russian bases in their territory,
`strategic partnership' and a treaty with Iran; to control the
flow of energy products through Russian territory and not Turkey;
and to collaborate with Greece against Turkey in Europe and the
Black Sea Straits. In the Black Sea region, Marchuk's
observations that Ukrainian-Turkish collaboration is a priority
for Kiev's security policy and both states' subsequent agreement
on military cooperation are exactly what alarms Russia about
Turkish policies and causes it to resist them.58 Russian
observers fear that dividing the Black Sea Fleet among the
littoral states gives Turkey an operational-strategic advantage
that would allow it to blockade the Bosporous and the littoral
states. Then Turkey (or NATO) could strangle those states'
seaborne trade, or allow NATO into the Black Sea with impunity.59
They also fear that, under the pretext of U.N. peacekeeping to
monitor the Georgian-Abkhazian or Nagorno-Karabakh war, NATO can
threaten the littoral states in these or other ways.60
Recent Russian political and military commentary also
evinces growing suspicion of Turkish aims in Transcaucasia and
Central Asia. Those reports postulate a `Turkic belt' of local
states and efforts to freeze Russia out of energy pipelines
there.61 Russia's ambassador to Ankara warned that any effort to
stir up Pan-Turkism in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus would
trigger Russian Pan-Slavism, a force he did not define.62
Military writers in particular charge that Turkey is
allowing NATO into the Black Sea, fomenting Pan-Turkism, seeking
local unilateral domination, or pursuing a leading role in an
anti-Russian `Baltic-Black Sea' security system.63 The proximity
of the Danube to the war in Yugoslavia and Turkish staging areas
in the Black Sea heightens their concerns. On February 24, 1993
Krasnaia Zvezda stated that "Any WEU actions on the Danube must
be approved by Russia."64 The Black Sea Fleet's Commander in

Chief, Admiral Baltin, has expressed concern lest France, Spain,
and Italy participate in a Black Sea blockade of Yugoslavia and
over the November 1992 Bulgarian-NATO joint exercises there.65
For these reasons, the September 1993 Russo-Ukrainian accord
allowing Russia to buy out Ukraine's share of the Black Sea Fleet
in return for Kiev's debts to Moscow leaves Turkey face-to-face
with Russia and substantially degrades the role Ukraine could
have played in maintaining Black Sea security. Russian
opposition to Turkey's aims in the vicinity of the Black Sea will
likely grow from now on.
Russia has also recently asked for changes in the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to allow it to deploy
more conventional forces in what is now the North Caucasian
Military district. Russian officials cite their concerns over the
wars between Georgia and Abkhazia, among the North Caucasian
republics, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War.66 More candidly,
however, they admit to a great and deep-seated fear of Turkish
influence and/or Muslim fundamentalism, which they often,
wrongly, lump together.67 Ambassador Richard Armitage, the Bush
administration's coordinator for aid to Russia, noted that the
military dislikes the terms and limits in the CFE treaty and may
also wish to use these troops to add pressure on Ukraine.68 That
too is against Turkish interests since any such move would
restore Russian military pressure to the Black Sea and would
entail an imperial Russian state structure that would necessarily
be authoritarian and a great destabilizer in Eurasia.
Russia's request to revise the CFE accords "angered" Ankara
who dismissed "the threat from the south" as "very meaningless."
Ankara is reportedly anxious about "whether Russia is trying to
extend its sovereignty to the Caucasus region by avoiding the
responsibilities it has undertaken within the framework of the
agreement on conventional arms reduction."69 Ankara views any
reopening of the CFE Treaty as touching off "a significant arms
race in Europe," and has formally opposed it.70 Official sources
also reject Russian fears about the wars to its south,
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are in the southern
part of Russia. In view of the agreement on arms
reductions, they have a total of 1,800 tanks. However,
Russia has 6,000 tanks. That the three republics, which
have internal problems and disputes with each other,
would pose a threat to Russia is impossible. Meanwhile
Russia does not have a border with Turkey anymore.71
These Russian political moves, continued fighting in the
Black Sea littoral, Georgia versus Abkhazia and the war over
Nagorno-Karabakh, and tensions with Ukraine indicate that for
Turkey, the Russian threat is by no means dead, even if it is
frozen for the moment. The strains over the CFE Treaty, plus the
other issues aggravating relations with Moscow illustrate that
the ancient Turco-Russian rivalry in Eurasia continues, albeit
under the conditions of the new international order.

Russia continues to view Turkey as an adjacent power and
therefore will resist any deployment of forces in Turkey from
which it believes it could be attacked. Russia's proximity to
Turkey creates in Russian thinking the notion that Turkey is part
of its natural defense perimeter. Accordingly, Moscow tends to
view Turkey's military preparedness as illegitimate while Russian
policies are conceived, not bilaterally, but in a global or
Pan-European strategic context that legitimates their
activities.72
In addition, although a consensus that Turkey not be the
base for a NATO or other attack on the USSR and now Russia has
existed for several years in Turkey, Russia still expresses alarm
at any Muslim unity. It prefers a disunited Middle East on its
borders to one united by any common interest or ideology.
Therefore Turkey's efforts to organize the Black Sea region,
Central Asia, and the Caucasus stimulate an equally strong
Russian counter-effort. Russia's response takes the shape of
proposals to send Russian peacekeeping forces into Azerbaijan and
to station troops in Armenia and around the former Soviet bases,
and warnings against intervention to deter Turkey and Iran. Both
Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev have also
made it clear that Russia supports Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity and Kozyrev observed that Russia's political aim is a
peace settlement that will enhance its position in both Armenia
and Azerbaijan.73
Part of Russia's reply to Turkey is Yeltsin's call for
military bases in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, crucial areas
for Turkey.74 Russia has also fashioned an anti-Turkish entente
with Greece. In Greece, President Yeltsin conceded that he and
then Prime Minister Mitsotakis had discussed the Muslim threat in
the Balkans and the southern borders of the former USSR. Both men
reiterated the total coincidence of their views on Bosnia and the
necessity of vetoing any effort to intervene there.75
Russia and Greece also proposed to locate the Black Sea
Trade and Development Bank in Salonika, not Istanbul. Russia
also tried to prevent formation an economic, cultural, and
political-legal commission within the BSECZ since that would
enable that organization to discuss political issues like
Russia's intervention in Moldova, as Moldova's Head of
Parliament, Petre Lucinschi proposed.76
Russian resistance to the BSECZ's falling under Turkish
influence or leadership is another crucial aspect of its
resistance to Ankara's policies. This is because Turkey's
initiative in creating the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone
was a linchpin in both its "Eastern" and "Western" policies.
Through its association with the EC it hoped to lead its partners
in the BSECZ towards integration with the EC and thus play a
unifying and vanguard role in the Black Sea region and beyond.
Turkey would be the leading integrator of the Black Sea states

and Central Asia with Europe. Its influence would have grown to
the extent that these states achieved economic and political
stabilization and that could lead even to the amelioration of
rivalry with Greece. Thus Izvestiya's correspondent writes,
Something more undoubtedly lies behind these arguments.
Moscow is gradually assuming the role of chief arbiter
in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region and does
not wish for competition from anyone. In addition,
people in the Kremlin and on Smolenskaya Square
[Foreign Ministry building] do not want the BSECZ,
which was created on Turkey's initiative, to be turned
into a tool for the expansion of Ankara's political
influence in the region.77
As noted above, Russia and Iran also signed a treaty of
strategic partnership that aims to coordinate politics with Iran
in the ex-Soviet republics and which has paid handsome arms
transfer dividends for Iran. Finally another dispute is beginning
over Russian oil shipments through the Straits. Turkey has warned
that Russian efforts to ship its own oil and that of Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan through the Straits will force closure of the
Bosporous to allow the daily passage of two 130,000 ton vessels.
Therefore the Bosporous will be closed to Russian maritime
traffic 300 days a year to allow those tankers to pass through.
That will lead to obstruction of 55.8 percent of Russian trade,
or according to Prime Minister Ciller's letter to President
Yeltsin, 68 percent of that trade.
Although Russian officials claim they have no other ports
available to them through the Baltic or through Odessa, this does
not deter Turkish officials. They argue that Russia must
cooperate with Turkey on the proposed pipeline project or face
obstruction of its foreign trade. They contend that the risk of
accidents, and of environmental damage to the Straits is what
drives them. Turkey has duly suggested that Russia use existing
pipelines to channel exports to a proposed pipeline from Baku to
Ceyhan in Turkey that links up to Georgia and Russia.
Alternatively Turkey offers to lay a pipeline from Samsun or
Zonguldak on the Black Sea to Kirikkale. Then oil could be pumped
through the refinery linking Central Anatolia and Ceyhan to the
Mediterranean Sea.78 Thus oil from Central Asia and Azerbaijan
would be diverted from the pipeline to Novorossisk on the Black
Sea from whence it would go through the Bosporous, to an overland
pipeline that goes through Georgia, Armenia or Iran to
Southeastern Turkey (where the Kurdish issue is at its most
intense). Of course, the threat of closure of the Straits,
however justified, is the long-standing strategic threat to
Russia that it has always regarded as intolerable. And the issue
joined here reflects the centrality of energy issues in regional
geopolitics and security agendas.
Turkey's policy also reflects a tough-minded effort to
revise the Montreux Treaty of 1936 allowing unhampered peacetime

transit of tankers and merchant ships through the Straits. Until
now the Foreign Ministry had vetoed reopening that treaty as a
taboo. But now it is determined to revise the treaty, allegedly
to protect the Straits and Istanbul from ecological or other
economic damages.79 Whether those threats to the littoral of the
Straits are real or not, the threat to close down Russia's trade
and the determination to secure a pipeline linking Turkey with
the energy rich regions of the former USSR are quite tangible, as
this episode shows. As the Financial Times reports, this Turkish
pipeline project is the economic lifeline and centerpiece of an
ambitious foreign policy to overcome the obstacles to Turkish
economic linkages with Central Asia. Meanwhile, for Russia the
prospect of losing control over its former satellites' natural
resource base and access to ports and refineries when it is
brandishing its economic power is also intolerable, a fact that
Turkey probably underestimated.80 Moreover the Financial Times
also observes that revision of the Montreux Treaty would likely
prejudice relations with all the littoral states in the Black Sea
and undermine the BSECZ set-up to cement regional trade ties.81
Four conclusions emerge from these conditions of
Russo-Turkish relations. First, Russia and Turkey are engaged in
an ever clearer regional rivalry from the Black Sea through
Transcaucasia to Central Asia. Second, Russian policies, in the
Black Sea, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia outline a growing
effort against Turkey and towards common cause with its enemies
and rivals, Greece and Iran. Third, because of this regional
rivalry, NATO still has enormous relevance to Turkey's security
and interests abroad. It is not by accident that Georgian
President Shevarnadze, who accused the Russian army of
intervening against Georgia in Abkhazia and highly values the
relationship with Turkey, has asked NATO, the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC), and Presidents Kohl and Clinton to
intervene diplomatically and politically in the region's
conflicts and undertake peacekeeping efforts there to restrain
Russian influence.82
Fourth, just as domestic economic constraints restrict
Turkey's regional influence, so too is Russian resistance a key
external factor that will prevent realization of the dream of
greater Turkish influence. Turkish officials apparently are
coming to grasp this. The new ambassador to Moscow, Ayhan Kamel,
told the Russian weekly, New Times, that the needs of the Central
Asian and Caucasian republics exceeds Turkey's resources and
potentials. Hence Turkey wants to get others, including Russia,
to help in reconstructing the republics. Pointedly, he added,
We maintain that Russia must necessarily aid the
Central Asian and Caucasian countries. There are two
reasons for that. Firstly, you lived in common with
them for one or two centuries. Secondly, these
countries have a considerable Russian minority. Hence
we believe Turkey and Russia could cooperate in aiding
them. We regard Russia there not as a rival, but rather

as a valuable partner with whom we should cooperate in
that respect.83
Turkey has had to recognize that Russia's regional influence
cannot be dislodged. Either it acts with Russia and accepts
partnership with it or it faces Moscow's superior power to resist
and obstruct Turkish initiatives. Even as it blocks Turkish
ambitions in Eurasia, Russia pursues a peaceful relationship with
Turkey and even sells it arms because both sides are wary of any
"Islamic" threat and have a substantial bilateral trade. In
addition Russia must be able to use the Black Sea and the Straits
for its seaborne trade. Those two factors give Turkey some
leverage. Nonetheless they do not erase the constant dynamics of
the bilateral relationship, i.e. Russian suspicion of Turkish
objectives and ability to resist them.
As in the past, Russia's proximity to Turkey and belief that
Turkey is inside its maritime and overall defense perimeter still
create a constant pressure on Turkey to defend her sovereignty
rather than undertake grandiose anti-Russian objectives, even now
when Russia is weak.84 Thus in Central Asia, the Black Sea, and
Transcaucasia, Russian resistance to Turkish ambitions, combined
with Turkey's inability to fully secure its objectives will
likely force Turkey to retract its dream of regional leadership.
TURKISH OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Turkish goals in Central Asia are easy to see. At the
macro-strategic level the overriding goal is to win many points
of economic, cultural, and political leverage in Central Asia to
preclude reversion to Russian control or movement towards
Iranian-style fundamentalism. Russia has historically oppressed
its Muslims and threatened Turkey's integrity. Iran-backed
fundamentalism could threaten Turkey's integrity if it is coupled
with support for the Kurds.85 But it more likely threatens the
profound political and institutional secularization at the heart
of Ataturk's legacy. In addition, Turkey wants to reinforce
Western perceptions of its ability to contain potential threats
from unstable Muslim areas. Turkey believes that the stronger its
position as a westernizing model for Central Asia, the stronger
its claim on the West for support.86 And by acting accordingly
Turkey makes that claim on the West.
For those reasons, the leverage Turkey seeks abroad need not
be interpreted as revived Pan-Turkism (though its rhetoric often
fans such fears). But that quest for strong points could also
seduce Turkey into really believing it is some sort of elder
brother, spokesman for, or more than a model for former Soviet
republics. Turkey's approach has already alarmed Central Asia and
Turkey's regional rivals: China, Iran, and Russia.87 Nonetheless
Turkey apparently remains committed to a strong regional presence
as a guarantor of stability and progress. As Premier, Demirel
proclaimed Turkey's readiness to assume political responsibility
from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, and that it has

never been as important for the United States or Europe as it is
today. More recently he expressed his hope that Turkey will
become one of the world's 10 major powers "some time in the
future."88 Ozal was even more outspoken as shown by his statement
quoted above at the "Turkic World Fraternity Friendship and
Cooperation Convention" in Antalya in March 1993.89
Rhetorically such statements go far beyond Demirel's very
cautious diplomacy to create merely a `peaceful circle' around
Turkey and eschew Ozal's more grandiose vistas.90 But the
rhetoric reveals Turkey's choice of a demanding agenda in
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Turkey must now be a factor for
regional stability and progress in regions dotted by conflicts
real or potential, a reversal of Ataturk's rejection of
Pan-Turkic policies. If we assess Turkish policies as preventive
diplomacy against ethnic conflicts, revived Russian domination,
or Islamic fundamentalism, we get a good sense of Turkey's
macro-strategic objectives in Central Asia that its other aims
serve.
For example, Turkey's extensive economic activity here aims
at achieving market access and connections to future business so
that its expanding economy has strong ties to these areas and
leverage over their future economic policies. Turkish
investments in telecommunications and in promoting the regional
Latinization of languages and alphabets also serve to deflect
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus away from Russia and Iran and
lead Turkey into clashes with Russia and Iran, which also are
trying to regain or obtain strong positions here. Russia has even
been willing to create crises in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to
retain its position.91 Russia also wholly dominates Central Asian
states' security and makes clear its intentions not to let them
out of its economic grasp.92 Iran and Russia, as we have seen,
also compete vigorously with Turkey for pipeline routes and
investments.
This leads to the third objective of Turkish activity: i.e.,
initiatives like the ECO. Those programs show that Turkey's
interests cannot be ignored and it can undertake key initiatives
to enhance regional security. But this goal involves a yet to be
reconciled contradiction. Turkey competes regionally both on its
own behalf and on behalf of Washington and the West. But to
establish its bona fides regionally it must convince local actors
that it pursues an independent regional policy and is not a U.S.
agent.93 Until Turkey resolves this contradiction it will find it
hard to attain its regional objectives in the new republics.
But, to be able to compete regionally it must collaborate with
Washington to secure vital economic assistance and entree into
Europe. Therefore it cannot break free of the contradiction that
is the inherent price of Turkey's post-1991 security posture.
INSTRUMENTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
In Central Asia, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked

political, cultural, communications, and economic initiatives.
Turkey moved fast to recognize and open embassies in all the new
states and to sponsor their membership in international agencies
like the CSCE and international or regional economic
organizations.94 Ankara has accepted some 10,000 students from
the new republics for higher education in Turkey and has begun
educating their officers in its institutions (apart from military
assistance provided to Azerbaijan in its war). It has set up
television links in Turkish with Central Asia through Intelsat,
funded Latinization and supplied materials, e.g., textbooks, to
create a common linguistic and educational base with Central
Asia, and invested substantially to integrate telecommunications
with these states.95
But the most visible and large-scale activity centers around
economic investments and assistance. Economic ties by direct
bilateral deals and creation of multilateral fora for economic
consultation and growth represent the deepest thrust of Turkey's
Central Asian policy. This is most visible in Turkish efforts to
gain access or direct control over energy sources and pipelines.
So too, the investments in telecommunications, education, and
linguistic rapprochement with Central Asia have a large economic
component and expectation of sizable future returns.96
Characteristically, Ozal embraced a still more grandiose vision,
namely, that within 15 years economic borders would have
disappeared even if political ones remain.97 The most optimistic
forecast was Turkish dominance in Central Asian markets, a kind
of common Turkic market. Turkey may have hoped for that after
November 1992, when these states met in Ankara. But closer
examination suggests that a Turkic common market is not in the
cards.98
Large-scale economic activity also takes place in the TACD
(Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development), an autonomous
organization within the Foreign Ministry. It is developing a
volunteers project to work with the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). The TACD, since its birth in 1992, has a $406
million budget to oversee, help, and develop projects for Central
Asia, the Caspian, Balkans, Black Sea, Eastern Europe, Near and
Middle East, Mediterranean, etc. It is supposed to supervise
assistance to those countries in education, culture, and
economics. It is involved in the Intelsat exchange but also is
developing projected satellite launches with and to Central Asia
and a fiber optic network linked to the ex-Soviet republics. The
TACD is building a highway to Central Asia through Iran, is
considering a regional university like the Middle East Technical
University, and is planning for the Trans-Eurasia Investment and
Development Bank headquartered in Ankara.99 This bank would also
be attached to the ECO.
Turkish airlines are also trying to corner Central Asia's
commercial airline routes.100 Official media also report around
1000 joint ventures with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan alone: gold
mining and refining, textile mills and factories, pipelines,

hotel refurbishing, and telecommunications networks. Turkey has
allocated between $1.1 and $1.2 billion in credits to Central
Asia and authorized $975 million in loans to the Turkic republics
that are backed by $200 million from Turkey's banks. Finally
many businesses are active locally.101 Taken at face value, these
economic and cultural ties suggest Turkey's strong posture as a
regional model, elder brother, and stabilizer.
ASSESSING TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
However, a deeper analysis of Turkey's Central Asian policy
suggests that while Turkey will undoubtedly achieve points of
influence or leverage upon regional developments, a leadership
role there is beyond its present capabilities. Several factors
are at work: Central Asian republics' aspirations for an
independent and diversified foreign policy, other states'
political-economic rivalry with Turkey, and Turkey's own economic
limitations due to its own extensive strategic agenda. Taken
together these factors' interaction argues against Turkish
dominance over Central Asia, as was feared in 1991-92 by many
Russian observers. Rather, it appears that a new version of the
old `Great Game' has already begun to draw the United States and
many other regional and extra-regional actors into the area. For
example, Turkey's drive for preeminence in Central Asia
undoubtedly led Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to proclaim a
`strategic partnership' and sign what amounts to a nonaggression
pact with Iran in Tehran.102
Similarly Russia has recently quite openly and brutally
deployed its economic and military power in Central Asia to
install or maintain pro-Moscow policies and ex-Communist
dictators. Since these dictators depend on Moscow for their
security and economic means of survival, pro-Turkish policies are
ruled out. Even in democratic Kyrgyzstan Vice-President Feliks
Kulov told NATO that Kyrgyzstan pays "great attention to
strengthening of the military alliance with Russia taking into
account the single system of the armed forces and economic
dependence in the sphere of the army's logistic support."103
The July 1993 decision by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to
work towards economic integration excluded Central Asia,
evidently deliberately. Russian Vice-Premier Shokhin made it
clear that Central Asians cannot flirt with or join economic
unions of Islamic states including Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran,
and still be included in this union.104 In other words, if they do
not opt for Russia, they will be out of the ruble zone and also
unable to function economically. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also
made clear Russia's ultimate goal that, "the governments proceed
from the fact that economic integration cannot be effective in
isolation without a wider, multilateral mutual action in the
political, defence, and legislative areas." Kozyrev further
developed this goal with his notion of a `shield' against
fundamentalism and a "club of friends of regional stability" in
Central Asia.105

Yet despite Russian pressure, Central Asian states do not
intend to be Turkey's `younger brothers.' Although grateful for
economic assistance, they are diversifying their sources of
foreign investment and interest to escape dependence on any one
state and they are also wary of Turkish ambitions.106 Central
Asian states resisted Turkish pressure for a true common market
at the ECO's 1992 Ankara conference.107 Finally, Russia, Turkey,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, South Korea,
Japan, and the United States now compete for Central Asian energy
resources or investments. Turkey cannot overcome this rivalry
and local interest in diversifying foreign investment and
influence.108
Furthermore, despite Turkish public and state interest in
Central Asian investments, through November 1992 Turkish exports
to Central Asia were only 2 percent of total exports. Only $150
million has been allocated from the $1.2 billion credits to these
states. And only $175 million of the available loans have been
utilized by the Turkic republics.109 Turkey's debt and high
inflation have also inhibited direct investment in Central Asian
energy. Istanbul may become a center of the oil business; but
Turkey cannot compete with Western oil companies in Central Asia
and Azerbaijan. It will more likely be an intermediary, not an
independent force in regional energy politics.110
Additionally, the Central Asian states obviously still
depend on Russian forces for security and to keep their internal
opposition from coming to power. In the final analysis they have
no choice. Turkey cannot protect them and never had any political
connection with the area. All these states repeatedly cite close
ties with Russia as their priority.111
Therefore while Turkey will undoubtedly obtain important
markets and some local influence, it is unlikely to realize its
larger dreams there. These republics may be Turkey's "dreamland"
but the reality will likely be very different. This conclusion
suggests that Turkey can promote its own and U.S. interests in an
anti-fundamentalist Central Asia based on `the Turkish model'
only up to a point. Turkey may be a model for Central Asia. But
even so it cannot offer what Central Asian leaders and their
publics most crave on the scale that they need it. Any effort to
provide that economic-political role of main benefactor will
saddle Turkey, and thus the United States with commitments beyond
their means. Such Turkish exertions would also further arouse the
suspicions of every state in the area. Turkey's actual powers are
consequently more limited than its ambitions might lead others to
think.
CONCLUSIONS
Central Asia is a vital area neither for Turkey nor the
United States, although it is important to Turkey for reasons of
consanguinity, ambition, and desire to block Russia and Iran.

Turkey cannot defend or subsidize it nor can the United States.
Ultimately, U.S. and Turkish interests comprise largely economic
and political goals and instruments to realize them. Turkey will
play a role in the regional balance of power. But only Russia, as
is the case in Tadzhikistan, can overcome the immense logistical
and strategic difficulties of military involvement in Central
Asia that is the acid test of real influence there. A Turkish
effort to play this role also contradicts a successful resolution
of Turkey's domestic security problems.
This same condition holds true for the Transcaucasus as long
as Turkey's border with Armenia is stabilized. If that border is
unstable, either a war with incalculable conclusions or a
political settlement in which Turkey is the loser is quite
likely. Indeed, by September 1993 it was apparent that Turkey's
policy in Transcaucasia had reached a dead end. Azerbaijan,
facing the threat of Armenian military partition, is opting to
join the CIS to obtain formal guarantees of Russian military
protection. Those guarantees, which also extend to Armenia, would
give Russia the formal basis to regain its regional
preeminence.112 And, if Russia extends its collective security
treaty to cover Azerbaijan as well as Armenia, it would be
logical to expect both Russian `peacekeeping' forces in the
former and permanent installations, i.e., bases there and perhaps
in or near the Caspian Sea to defend against Armenia, and by
extension, Iran and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan both
had to urge Russia to mediate the war as the only way to prevent
a wider war should Armenian forces go towards Nakhichevan, where
Turkey has treaty rights going back to 1921, or Iran.113 Here,
too, Turkey will be an important, but not decisive factor in the
new version of the great game. As Ambassador Kamel indicated,
partnership with Russia, and mainly on Russia's terms or
sufferance, is the best it can hope for. Apparently neither
Ankara nor Washington will take on Russia here. As a senior
Turkish Foreign Ministry official observed, Turkey's mistake was
that it had excessive expectations and ignored the Russian
factor.114 This turn of events graphically demonstrates both the
U.S.' and Turkey's regional weakness. Recently both Turkey and
the United States accepted Aliev's regime as a fait accompli.115
A U.S. Government that will not commit to defend Bosnia will not
do so for Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia, or Tadzhikistan.
Turkish objectives in those areas, although superficially
congruent with U.S. aims, do, in fact, go beyond what are, after
all, marginal U.S. interests. is part of the evolving U.S. policy
of `dual isolation' of Iran and Iraq, the United States will
probably have to rely more on Turkey in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia.116 However, continued pressure on Iraq exacts a
high price for Turkey, the depression of its southeastern region,
the locus of Kurdish unrest, and the closure of the Iraqi
pipeline which was a vital source of revenue. Thus Turkey now
wants to open the Iraqi pipeline, against U.S. interests.117 Thus
our pressure on Iraq affects vital Turkish interests and
undermines its domestic security, even as that pressure logically

suggests a greater Turkish role in the Muslim world.
Turco-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, Near and Middle East is
also reviving. That revival, in turn, will force Washington to
choose between Russian and Turkish influence in the former USSR.
Russia is now well-placed to win this contest, especially given
traditional U.S. disinterest in these regions. That victory will
undo Turkey's role in our anti-Iraq and anti-Iran policy, a role
that is already onerous to Turkey.
Thus, U.S. policy has yet to resolve the contradictions
based on support for Ankara and Moscow against Baghdad and Tehran
when Russia and Iran are allying against Turkey in Central Asia
and Transcaucasia. Since Washington cannot defend Turkey's
regional objectives without intensifying strains with Russia,
Iran, and local `insurgents,' a negotiated solution offering the
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh real national and personal autonomy
within an Azerbaijan constrained by treaty and international
guarantees, and mutual guarantees against economic warfare and
other belligerent acts seems a sounder basis for the
Transcaucasus. But no such plan is remotely visible. Instead, as
of September 1993 Armenian forces are driving to the Iranian
border and threaten to bifurcate Azerbaijan.118 Clearly neither
Ankara nor Washington has a viable program of action for the
Transcaucasus. And this has stimulated domestic opposition to
Ciller's government at home. Professor Mumtaz Soysal of Turkey's
Social Democratic Party said that since Turkey "did not know the
world in which it wished to play a role," it had created
expectations far beyond what its financial means could fulfill.
Other critics of the regime speak in even more apocalyptic terms,
i.e., that Turkey has lost its chance to become a regional
leader.119 Therefore any effort to push Turkey forward as the U.S.
regional `point man' runs aground at a time when the United
States is already cutting its aid to Turkey, is changing aid to
loans, introducing human rights conditions for it, and
threatening to close U.S. bases if Turkey does not like these
terms.120
Turkish official calls for foreign investment in Central
Asia underscore the fact that it is beyond Turkey's dreams to
dominate the area as it had hoped.121 These requests display the
limits on Turkish policy, not its strength. Meanwhile U.S. policy
supports Turkish efforts to block Russia, Iran, and Iraq and deny
them energy markets and influence in these regions. Yet the aid
to which Turkey feels entitled is already beyond the will of the
United States. This makes Washington an object of suspicion among
Turks.122 While Turkey will be a major player, preeminence in the
former Soviet Muslim republics is beyond its means, risks its
alliance with the United States, its political integrity and
stability, and neglects the Middle East and Europe, its true
priority.
Turkish officials now boast that the United States must
consult it before embarking on any policy in all four regions.123
Yet, that cannot imply a U.S. blank check that may have to be

paid in full plus interest. Turkey's strategic dilemma is
serious. But pursuit of a pro-Turkish zone in the former USSR
for its own and for Washington's benefit is not the answer.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As of autumn 1993, there is no doubt that Turkey stands at a
crossroads as it attempts to formulate a strategy appropriate to
its position. Turkey's international position today is not what
its elites or the United States confidently expected in 1991.
Therefore Turkey needs to rethink its strategy. Several of the
objectives and policies it eagerly embraced in the wake of the
Soviet collapse and Operation DESERT STORM have been revealed to
be incompatible with Turkish interests or beyond Turkish
capacities. The effort to propel Turkey into a leading regional
position has stimulated an assertive Russian response that Turkey
cannot and will not resist. We also, like the Turkish government,
believe that Iran is using Turkey's internal unrest due to the
Kurdish problem to destabilize it in Iran's rivalry with Turkey
for position and influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
The problem of the Kurds complicates both Turkey's domestic
sources of strength abroad and Turkey's international position
vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran, and potentially, Armenia. Perhaps for those
reasons Prime Minister Ciller was evidently pondering emphasizing
economics over military instruments to deal with the domestic
Kurdish problem.1 This emphasis on enhancing Turkey's economic
strength and position and on recovering Turkey's position in the
international energy market has also led Ankara to support
lifting the ban on Iraqi export of oil, in particular, opening
the pipeline from Iraq through Turkey. Those specific policies
towards Iraq directly clash with the U.S. policy of treating Iraq
as an enemy and imposing punitive restraints upon it.2
In Transcaucasia, however, we find the most pressing and
urgent need for a rethinking of Turkish security strategy. Turkey
has apparently lost or is losing out to Russian policy in the
Armeno-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Continuing Armenian
offensives, if unchecked, could lead to war involving Turkey and
even Russia and Iran against Erevan, which would be a disaster
for Turkey as its leaders recognize. On the other hand, it
appears that Russia is successfully employing the full range of
both overt and covert political and military operations against
the fighters in this war and in the Georgian-Abkhazian one to
reassert its position as the sole arbiter and protector of the
Caucasus and Transcaucasus.3 The attainment of that goal would
deprive Turkey of the chance to achieve that coveted objective
which had influenced policy after 1991. Russia's actions take on
a decidedly sinister light when the general climate of military
insubordination and independence of the Russian armed forces is
factored into the equation, because it is unclear whether or not
the Yeltsin government knows and is controlling these covert as
well as overt operations. As we have seen, the overt policy is to
restore Russian regional primacy. But if local or central
military actors are undertaking their own actions with a view
towards restoring a "Pax Russica" in the area, the consequences

of their actions could lead to intensification or spread of the
fighting in and around Azerbaijan. Neither answer is comforting
to those who count either on stability in the CIS or on the
permanent end of the Russian empire.4
At the same time, the United States is apparently willing to
back the Turkish demand, constraining maritime oil shipments
through the Straits, thus ranging the United States against an
important Russian interest in that part of the world.5 Because
the Clinton administration has not announced a public posture on
the war in Transcaucasia, it cannot be known whether this support
on oil transport signifies a U.S. move towards an overall policy
position on the Transcaucasus and the entire region. However,
because the Bush and Clinton administrations have supported
Turkey's efforts to upgrade its influence in the old Soviet
empire until now, the U.S. Government evidently will have to
articulate its position and interests in this region. By the same
token, a reformulation of U.S. policy towards Iraq may become
necessary if the combined weight of the Kurdish problem in Turkey
and Turkey's need for oil and trade revenues from Iraq leads it
out of the embargo and support for Iraq's international
isolation. The concatenation of events in Central Asia, the
Kurdish problem, and Transcaucasia all point, therefore, to the
urgent necessity of rethinking the entire range of U.S and
Turkish interests, both singly and in tandem, with regard to
those regions.
Turkey's European policies will also have to be reassessed.
Turkey's priority still remains its European connection.6 The
sons of Ataturk still look to the West. And their turn to Central
Asia has the object of appearing as Europeans to Central Asia and
of using the promise of stabilizing that region as a lever with
which to enter the EU, WEU, and the new Europe. But here, too,
Turkey has found Greco-Russian resistance to its efforts in the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and those states' resistance
to its policies or potential policies in Yugoslavia's wars.
Similarly Turkey is dismayed at the West's refusal, through its
various security organizations, to take an active role in
terminating the aggression it perceives directed against the
Bosnian Muslims and potentially threatening Muslims in Kossovo.
The various wars from Yugoslavia to Tadzhikistan that have
broken out since 1991 have all acted to reduce Turkey's regional
prospects in both Europe and Asia. The crisis in the Balkans
aggravates Greco-Turkish rivalries, and triggers European alarm
about Muslim influence in Europe. The wars in Georgia and
Transcaucasia preclude the very stabilization needed there by
Turkey to make its economic-political presence felt. Similarly
the economic collapse of Ukraine that forced it into a deal with
Russia over its nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet precludes
both stabilization of Ukraine and too overt a connection with
Turkey. And the ongoing war in Tadzhikistan that has led to the
further introduction of Russian troops along with Russia's blunt
efforts at regional economic coercion of that area have also

deflected Central Asian states from Turkey.
Thus, in all the areas of concern that we have analyzed,
Turkish objectives are receding further from attainment and are
increasingly seen as beyond Turkey's foreseeable capabilities. To
attain its priority goals in Europe and Asia, Turkey probably
will have to obtain increasing support from the United States.
However, Turkish interests could, as in the Iraqi case, introduce
frictions with the United States. Turkish official opinion
apparently was also disturbed by President Clinton's U.N. speech
because it apparently implied to Ankara that the U.N. and the
United States could not or would not address the Transcaucasian
and/or Bosnian wars, an approach that called U.N. credibility
into question and effectively left Turkey as a lone `front-line'
state confronting a resurgent Russia, and defiant Serbia and
Armenia.7 And, on Iraq, Turkey is apparently reversing the threat
made by the Clinton administration that it might further cut back
aid to Turkey if it continues to demand guaranteed security
subsidies irrespective of its Kurdish policy. Prime Minister
Ciller hinted that if the United States does not arrange to
recompense Turkey for its losses due to the Iraqi embargo, it
might not extend its agreement to allow its airfield and roads to
be used to supply Iraqi Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.8 Thus
a tone of mutual blackmail is creeping into U.S.-Turkish
relations even as we proclaim Turkey a model against Iranian
backed fundamentalism and a bulwark against Russia.
The problem here is that at the same time as the United
States has encouraged Turkey to expand its objectives, its means
for doing so are shrinking. In Russia, the government fully
believes that the West and the U.N. have implicitly recognized
Moscow's mandate, under the guise of peacekeeping, to restore its
hegemony in Transcaucasia. Both that hegemony and Western
support for it are fundamental objectives of the Yeltsin
government.9 And Russia's demand for revising the CFE Treaty in
Transcaucasia is widely, and rightly we would argue, seen in
Ankara an intending "to obstruct the possibility of any direct or
indirect intervention in the region by other countries, as was
the case when the former Soviet Union existed."10 Yet apart from
inviting Prime Minister Shevarnadze of Georgia to Washington,
supporting Georgia's independence, covertly attempting as we did
to strengthen its security services, and offering small amounts
of aid to it, the United States has yet to outline a policy for
the Transcaucasus or a strategy to stop Russian imperial
restoration there. Although our special ambassador to the area,
John Maresca, has stated U.S. opposition to exclusive Russian
peacekeeping and favored a role for Turkey, more than this is
needed.11
Thus Turkey is essentially forced to confront the Russians
with only intangible means of support from the United States.
Turkish friction with key states like Russia, or with the Kurds,
or other Muslim or European states may contribute to the decline
of U.S. support which apparently is ebbing due to international

retrenchment. Or alternatively, such frictions might force
Washington into a position of having to choose between Turkish
and other states' or actors' key interests which are more
important to it, e.g. Russia. Presumably that is the reason why
Prime Minister Ciller told the press before her trip to
Washington that she hoped to persuade the United States to view
the Middle East and Transcaucasia "through Turkish lenses."12
At the same time Turkey clearly needs the United States to
smooth her way into Europe. But the Kurdish insurgency has become
a threat to all of Turkey's vital international objectives.
Turkey believes that Iran and Armenia are behind PKK attacks and
that some of these attacks by the Kurds in Turkey and the
Armenians in Azerbaijan are directed against Turkish oil
pipelines to dissuade Western investment and disrupt its vital
energy programs. Moreover Armenia and Iran each are evidently
assisting the PKK in its attacks.13 By the fall of 1993 it had
also become clear that there was no end in sight to the Kurdish
insurgency and it was reaching a new level of ferocity, to the
extent that the Turkish military, which was running the
counter-insurgency program, has promised to crush the insurgency
by spring 1994 or institute martial law.14
American and Western observers in Turkey concur that this
primarily military approach is doomed to fail with incalculable
consequences, and our analysis agrees with that conclusion. But
evidently, mindful of Turkey's role in NATO, and agreeing with
Ankara's depiction of the insurgents as terrorists, they have
held back from speaking out.15 Yet, at the same time, this
spreading insurgency makes it impossible for Turkey to play its
expected role elsewhere and leads to friction over aid with the
United States. Most importantly, it has become apparent to Ciller
and her government that the Kurdish problem is the greatest
present obstacle to membership in the EU, inasmuch as the
European Parliament is now demanding fundamental changes in
Turkish policy towards the Kurds.16 So, in Europe as well,
Turkey's domestic and security problems, as Sezer noted above,
are inextricably enmeshed.
Thus there is a need for a rethinking of American policy
vis-a-vis Turkey's European objectives, the Kurds, Iraq, and for
clear U.S. and Turkish objectives in Transcaucasia and Central
Asia. Although both sides are in constant communication, they
need to rethink and harmonize their perspectives to achieve more
meaningful cooperation and to integrate Turkey more fully with
Europe so that it can play the larger role to which it aspires.
The most fundamental task for the United States is to clarify its
own objectives with regard to the areas and issues in question:
Balkans, Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Russian imperial longings, and Turkish integration in Europe. It
must undertake that clarification with Turkey which must likewise
clarify its interests and capabilities. Then together the two
states must devise a program to strengthen their mutual
capability to achieve those interests that are vital to both and

which can be attainable over time, even in a worst case scenario.
Turkey cannot be made to do for the United States what
Ankara cannot do for itself or what Washington will not or cannot
do either. If the Russian empire is to be stopped in the South
then the United States and Ankara must provide the resources
necessary to achieve that overriding geopolitical goal. If
neither side is willing, and Turkey will not act unilaterally,
then we should forget about pushing Turkey into the breach
against both Teheran and Moscow as we undercut it because of
displeasure with its domestic politics. Therefore, the authors
have outlined specific suggestions as to how U.S.-Turkish
relations may be further consolidated and how a coherent Turkish
policy that positively contributes to regional security may be
jointly devised. We recommend the following specific U.S. actions
apart from the need to outline general regional objectives in
cooperation with Ankara.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The United States must continue to encourage its European
allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war
security environment, to include greater participation in
European political and security organizations. More than
rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken
to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance
and to assuage Turkish anxieties.
The following initiatives represent potential actions that
the United States should undertake.
Economic Initiatives.
• Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's
eventual membership in the EU. For example,
-- Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.
-- Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to
optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive foreign military
sales debts, whenever possible.
-- Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly
concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey
overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.
-- Encourage greater private American investment in
Turkey.
Diplomatic Initiatives.
• Influence European allies to overcome obstacles to full
Turkish membership in pan-European institutions such as the WEU

and EU.
• Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to
maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and
citizenship requirements.
• Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the
outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.
Security Initiatives.
• Continue to support to Turkey's military modernization
program.
-- As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw
down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish
military capabilities.
-- Provide military assistance grants as opposed to
credits.
-- Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10
military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does
not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position
vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit
analysis may be in order.
• The United States must exert influence in NATO that
ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,
-- Ensure continued funding of existing and planned
NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey.
-- Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey
that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish
forces. This may require reducing funds available within the
Central Region.
-- Increase Turkish command and staff officer
representation in appropriate NATO commands (e.g., NATO
headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).
-- While recognizing the political difficulties
involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to
have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South
located in Turkey.
-- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could
increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.
• Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships,
the United States should pursue security initiatives in a
multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:

-- Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior
partner.
-- Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are
continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be
used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic
importance of Turkey.
Initiatives Regarding Kurdistan and the Former Soviet Union.
• With regard to the Kurdish insurgency, the United States
should privately try to get Ankara to seek a solution
incorporating more economic and political means that do not
entail exclusive military repression but do safeguard the
integrity of the country.
-- This also entails pressure, both public and private,
against Iran, Syria, and Armenia to the extent that they are
aiding the PKK. The shift to economic-political steps combined
with military ones should be the carrot and this pressure the
stick.
-- Particularly with respect to Armenia, which is
conniving at the dismemberment of Azerbaijan, this pressure
should be made public and contingent upon an end to aid for the
PKK and a cease-fire and move to negotiations. More than most
places, Armenia is vulnerable to sanctions and economic pressure.
Although this means taking on the Armenian lobby here, the stakes
are worth it because this war is no longer in defense of a
threatened minority, but a war to destroy Azerbaijan.
-- To overcome the regional economic distress in
Southeast Turkey due to the repercussions stemming from the
embargo of Iraq's oil, the United States ought to allow Turkey
concessionary aid for economic development there. This would also
alleviate the economic sources of local unrest.
• The United States must decide what its objectives in
Central Asia are apart from human rights and decide to what
degree it will support the region's independence from Russia,
especially in energy. It might well consider assistance in the
energy, transportation, and agricultural areas to those states,
either alone or with Turkey, to overcome problems in the most
crucial sectors and promote their further growth and economic
integration.
• Similarly it is necessary to outline a coherent policy
with regard to the wars in Transcaucasia and the shape of an
international settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh that secures the
interests of both the local belligerents, as well as Turkey,
Russia, and Iran. Threatened sanctions against Armenia, as
suggested above should be considered as well as the use of a
multilateral peacemaking (not peacekeeping) force, or perhaps

U.S., Turkish, and Russian forces in the area until a settlement
is reached.
-- By the same token a clearer line is needed with
regard to Georgia which is the obvious victim of Russian efforts
to dismember it, not unlike what Serbia has done in Bosnia. Once
again the authors reiterate that a strategy, not just
declarative policies, is essential to prevent a return of the
Russian empire and of the conviction that such a trend is
supported abroad.
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